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The objective of this dissertation is to examine the dynamics 
of corporate diversification and capital structure theoretically and 
empirically. As a main thesis, corporate diversification is predicted 
to induce increased debt capacity of conglomerate firms. The thrust 
of the argument in this paper is predicated on the theoretical and 
empirical merit of the net income hypothesis. Similarly, the financial 
advantage of conglomerate firms, in terms of augmented leverage capacity, 
is based on inverse relationship between operating risk and financial 
leverage maintained by the traditional school of finance. To pursue 
this line of inquiry, in addition to the introductory and concluding 
chapters, the study is divided into three main parts: theoretical
framework, review of selected empirical studies on conglomerate mer­
gers and capital structure, and empirical analysis regarding the lever­
age effects of corporate diversification.
Other empirical studies concerning conglomerate performance 
have, either relied on a naive view of diversification, or have dili­
gently avoided the complexity of conglomerate portfolio analysis at 
the operating level. The unique feature of the present study is the 
application of the portfolio model for measuring the operative risk of 
a conglomerate firm. Although the empirical investigation is limited 
to a sample of one conglomerate firm, due to the paucity of financial 
information, the theoretical framework underlying the hypothesis and 
the model developed for testing it are general. The empirical analysis 
consisted of three principal and successive steps: analysis of sub­
sidiaries, conglomerate portfolio analysis, and regression analysis.
As a preliminary step, parameters of individual subsidiaries are com­
puted in terms of variance of operating returns, covariances among 
operating returns, and participation levels for eight subsidiaries 
of the LTV Corporation. A model of portfolio standard deviation 
is employed to determine the variability of the parent company's 
operating return, at the end of each year during the period 1962-1971. 
Finally, the proposition pertaining to the leverage implication of the 
portfolio effect is tested by separately regressing four different 
standards of leverage on the parameter of operating risk. Although 
it is not proper to make a generalization about the universe on the ba­
sis of evidence derived from a case study, the hypothesis of this 
paper is supported; diversification increases the leverage capacity 
of conglomerate firms.
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THE LEVERAGE IMPLICATION OF THE PORTFOLIO EFFECT
FOR MULTI-INDUSTRY FIRMS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background and Purpose of the Study
With reference to the growth of firms externally, the economic
history of the United States distinguishes three major merger movements.^
The first merger wave took place at the turn of the century. During
the period 1898-1902, business combinations were largely limited to firms
within the same industry. Hence, horizontal mergers were the dominant
2
feature of the first merger activity. The second merger wave occurred 
in late 1920's and was characterized by a large number of vertical mer­
gers. During this period, many firms integrated different stages of the 
economic process by moving backward to sources of supply, or forward to
3
distribution outlets. The third and longest merger wave dates back to
^arry H. Lynch, Financial Performance of Conglomerates (Boston: 
Harvard University Press, 1971), 17-46.
2
Samuel Richardson Reid, Mergers, Managers,and the Economy (New 
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1968), 39.
3
George D. McCarthy, Acquisitions and Mergers (New York: Ronald
Press Company, 1963), 3-10.
the end of World War II with the activity persisting to date. A unique 
feature of the third merger movement was the increasing number of conglo­
merate business combinations. This trend has been characterized as many 
firms becoming a "general store of businesses,
The first two merger movements stimulated a great deal of aca­
demic interest in the area of mergers, both from the view point of the 
firm and the economy in general. Economic forces propelling horizontal 
and vertical mergers were explained in terms of monopoly power and oper­
ating economies. Increases in industrial concentration were studied and 
the implications for a competitive market structure were noted. In terms 
of national economic policy, steps were taken to preserve competition 
with the passage of antitrust laws. Shift of emphasis in economic analy­
sis from a classical model of pure competition to monopolistic and oli­
gopolistic markets was not a matter of accident. To suggest that merger 
movements may have contributed to the evolution of economic analysis with­
in a setting of imperfect markets is more than mere speculation.
In spite of its persistence and momentum, the third and recent 
merger movement has not been credited for stimulating much scholarly 
thought on conglomerate mergers. Reid presents a documented indictment 
against the economic profession for a benign neglect of an important area 
in the study of industrial structure.^ According to Reid, in the Index 
of Economic Journals for the period 1954-66, only twenty-six articles 
could be counted on topics related to mergers. In the American Economic
^Reid, Mergers, Managers,and the Economy, 80. 
^Ibid., III.
3Review, the official publication of the American Economic Association, 
only three articles appeared on mergers during the period 1954-63. A few 
broadly stated hypotheses that attempt to explain the incidence of con­
glomerate mergers exist; but there appears to be a general lack of coher­
ent theory and body of empirical evidence on such mergers.
In the preface to the paperback edition of the Foundations of 
Economic Analysis, Paul Samuelson, with characteristic perceptiveness, 
observed that one of the outstanding differences between art and science 
is the cumulative impact of the latter. Heeding the wisdom of the elder 
economist, the purpose of this dissertation is to examine the dynamics 
of corporate diversification and capital structure by drawing from the 
theory of corporate finance, portfolio theory, and microeconomics.
Prior to the publication of the famous article by Franco Modigliani 
and Merton H. Miller in 1958, financial theory had maintained that the 
cost of capital and, hence, the value of the firm was a function of lever­
age.^ The traditional position (net income hypothesis) is based on obser­
vations about investor preference for securities of firms using unique 
mixes of financing. Modigliani and Miller countered the traditional posi­
tion by asserting that the cost of capital or, its equivalent, the value 
of the firm is independent of leverage. The argument of the two scholars 
(net operating income hypothesis) rests on two critical assumptions re­
garding the mechanism of the arbitrage process and the absence of tax 
effects. Whereas the net operating income hypothesis is a precursor of
^Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment," American Economic 
Review. XLVIII (June, 1958), 261-97.
the separation theorem, both concepts treat Investment and financing 
decisions as dichotomous.^ In a subsequent paper, Modigliani and Miller 
conceded that, when tax effects are taken into consideration, the cost
O
of capital is dependent on leverage. Although this is a minor conces­
sion, the dispute over capital structure effects vanishes when the re­
strictive assumptions governing the leverage-independence hypothesis are 
relaxed.
The thrust of the proposition in this paper derives from the 
traditional theory of capital structure and the modified version of the 
Modigliani-Miller position. Before defining the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, the major arguments of the traditional school merit a re­
statement. First, the concept of optimal capital structure is theoreti­
cally sound and empirically valid. Second, the optimal debt capacity of 
a firm depends on its operating risk. Third, operating risk and financial 
leverage vary inversely. An inverse relationship between operating risk 
and financial leverage signifies important implications for examining 
the effect of diversification on capital structure. A conglomerate firm 
is the equivalent of a portfolio of subsidiaries from different industries. 
Diversity of industries composing the conglomerate portfolio implies that 
the co-movement of their operating returns are, at least, less than
Without requiring assumptions of homogeneous-risk class and the 
arbitrage process, Hamada has reconciled Propositions I and II with the 
capital asset pricing model under conditions of market equilibrium. For 
more detail see Robert S. Hamada, "Portfolio Analysis, Market Equilibrium 
and Corporation Finance," Journal of Finance, XXIV (March, 1969), 13-31.
g
Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "Corporate Income Taxes 
and the Cost of Capital: A Correction," American Economic Review, LII
(June, 1963), 433-43.
5perfectly positive. Provided that correlations among operating returns 
are neither zero nor perfectly positive, the operating risk of a firm 
can be reduced by means of diversification. Since operating risk and 
financial leverage are Inversely related, a diversified firm will adjust 
its capital structure by using more debt in its financing mix. On the 
basis of the preceding relationships, the hypothesis of this paper states 
that some amount of increased debt capacity can be induced by corporate 
diversification. The secondary purpose of the study is to measure diver­
sification performance at the operating level by using the portfolio 
approach.
Organization of the Study
This study consists of five chapters in the following order: 
introduction, theoretical framework, review of selected empirical studies, 
methodology and results of empirical investigation, and summary and con­
clusions. In Chapter I, the purpose and background of the study are 
stated, the organization of the study is described, and the limitations 
of the empirical analysis are explained.
In Chapter II, the theoretical foundation for the stated hypo­
thesis is developed. Although this chapter is divided into seven subtopics, 
four main areas are covered. In the first two parts, an interdependence 
between operating risk and financial leverage is examined and the implica­
tions are extended to the effect of diversification on capital structure. 
Although they do not follow each other, for reasons to be explained sub­
sequently, two sections are devoted to survey and evaluation of the theory 
of conglomerate mergers. A review of standard portfolio analysis, in which
6securities are the decision variables, is followed by portfolio analysis 
of conglomerate diversification. In the last part of Chapter II, the 
leverage implication of the portfolio effect is contrasted with the vari­
ous concepts of financial economies ambiguously attributed to conglomer­
ate firms.
In Chapter III, seven selected empirical studies are critically 
reviewed. Five articles cover various aspects of conglomerate perform­
ance. Three of these concern evaluation of diversification performance 
within a portfolio framework. A number of empirical investigations re­
lating to optimal capital structure have been published. Almost all 
these studies use the industry as a surrogate for equlvalent-risk class. 
The two articles on capital structure, included in this review, avoid 
the popular approach of equating an industry to a homogeneous-risk class.
Chapter IV combines the methodology and results of empirical an­
alysis for testing the proposition that corporate diversification can in­
crease the leverage capacity of conglomerate firms. The empirical inves­
tigation is a case study of the LTV Corporation during the period 1962-71. 
For a period of ten years, the pattern of diversification and the trend 
of capital structure are compared by means of regression analysis. A 
portfolio analysis of conglomerate diversification is preceded by analysis 
of subsidiaries. The outstanding feature of this dissertation is the use 
of the portfolio model for measuring the effect of corporate diversifica­
tion on operating risk. After regressing portfolio operating risk on 
financial leverage, the degree of association between the bivariate sample 
is tested for statistical significance.
The employment of dynamic portfolio analysis in evaluating a 
complex organization, such as a conglomerate firm, cannot be properly 
appreciated without some historical perspective about the subject com­
pany. Accordingly, a chronological account of major developments with 
respect to acquisitions, divestitures, and organizational changes are 
briefly reviewed for the period covered in the study. These develop­
ments, coupled with the necessity of adjusting time series, underscore 
the difficult task of subjecting corporate diversification to portfolio 
analysis at the operating level.
Scope and Limitations of Empirical Analysis
In a recent study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission,
nine of the largest conglomerate corporations were surveyed to determine
g
the competitive effects of conglomerate mergers. The fifth chapter of 
the report was devoted to an evaluation of information loss resulting 
from conglomerate expansion. While wide variations were found among the 
nine conglomerates in the degree of detail provided in published annual 
reports, all were criticized for failing to furnish pertinent informa­
tion on divisional and product-line b a s i s . T h e  companies sampled were 
declared notorious for using high level of aggregation in their reporting 
practices. If the basic functions of financial reporting are to enhance 
efficient allocation of resources, promote efficiency of management, and
g
U.S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Conglomerate 
Merger Performance; An Empirical Analysis of Nine Corporations (Washington,
D.C.; Government Printing Office, 1973), 12,
^°Ibid., 187-89.
8protect the interest of stockholders, the survey companies were found 
remiss :
Perhaps the most valuable contribution of this study is that 
it points out how little is known about the operations of 
conglomerate firms. There is a serious "information gap" be­
tween the information available to managers of conglomerates 
and that available to the public. Typically, conglomerates 
publish little or nothing in the way of divisional profit in­
formation. It is difficult for stockholders, researchers, 
potential entrants, or regulatory agencies to understand either 
the present performance or the future prospects of conglomer­
ate firms. Their continued growth brings a deterioration in 
the quantity and quality of economic intelligence publicly 
available.il
The existing quality of publicly obtainable financial informa­
tion renders the task of performing portfolio analysis of conglomerate 
diversification at the operating level rather arduous. Standard port­
folio analysis begins with security analysis. Similarly, conglomerate 
portfolio analysis should be preceded by generating information about 
the elementary units of the portfolio: average operating returns, vari­
ance of returns, and covariances among operating returns. But the com­
putation of covariances requires parallel and continuous time series for 
each subsidiary during the period covered by the study. As noted earlier, 
conglomerate firms are not reputed for providing balance sheets and in­
come statements by subsidiary, much less on continued basis. In view of 
paucity of financial information, in a form suitable for portfolio anal­
ysis, a larger sample of conglomerate firms could not be included in the 
empirical analysis. Nevertheless, the theoretical framework underlying 
the hypothesis of this study and the model developed for testing it are
^4bld., 13.
general for examining the dynamics of corporate diversification and
capital structure.
Problems of data were the only consideration in limiting the
scope of the empirical investigation to a sample of one conglomerate
firm; the LTV Corporation. Moreover, the FTC report singles out LTV
12
as the only exception in providing annual reports by subsidiary.
Even in the case of LTV, frequent acquisitions and abandonments by the 
parent company and its subsidiaries, coupled with occasional internal 
reorganizations, prevented a more comprehensive portfolio analysis. 
Consequently, both direct and indirect LTV subsidiaries were reduced 
to eight manageable subsets. Information gap concerning some subsi­
diaries, such as the Okonite Company, was surmounted by means of rea­
sonable approximation.
^^ Ibid., 162.
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Introduction
An aspect of the doctrine of corporate finance, designated as 
the traditional theory, acknowledges inter-industry variations in capi­
tal structure as a direct consequence of differences in business risk 
characteristics of industries. According to the traditional school, 
operating risk and financial leverage are predicted to vary in an in­
verse fashion. A specification of this relationship implies the validity 
of optimal capital structure.
With the traditional view of corporate leverage as a point of 
departure, this paper is primarily concerned with examining a special 
case of the interdependence between operating risk and financial lever­
age: the effect of conglomerate diversification on capital structure.
Specifically, it is argued here that some quantum of additional debt 
capacity is bound to be induced by conglomerate diversification.
To develop a theoretical basis for the main thesis, several 
related issues are discussed and integrated with the principal line 
of inquiry. In the first part, the interdependence of investment and 
financing decisions is argued in general terms. In the second part, 
the relationship between operating risk and financial leverage is
10
11
specified and the implications are extended to conglomerate diversifi­
cation.
Two sections are devoted to a survey of the theory of conglom­
erate mergers. The various explanations of the "urge to merge" across 
industrial lines are discussed under three broad categories: the size-
maximization hypothesis, the profit-maxlmization hypothesis, and the 
risk-independence hypothesis. Diversification and its by-product finan­
cial synergy are singled out as a salient explanation of the conglomer­
ate phenomenon. After criticizing the popular but naive measure of 
corporate diversification, the portfolio approach is proposed as a bet­
ter alternative. Analysis of conglomerate diversification within a 
portfolio framework is preceded by a review of portfolio analysis of 
securities as a point of departure.
In the last section, the various notions of financial economies, 
frequently cited in conjunction with conglomerate mergers, are juxta­
posed with the effect of corporate diversification on capital structure. 
High leverage capacity relating to multi-industry firms is underscored 
as a logical result of diversification.
This chapter covers a broad spectrum of issues related to diver­
sification and capital structure. Whereas a comprehensive treatment of 
a complex problem is partly desirable, a pursuit of thoroughness entails 
opportunity cost, such as, discontinuity of the main line of inquiry.
In conclusion to this chapter, the dynamics of diversification and capi­
tal structure are brought into focus without the interference of lateral 
issues.
12
Interdependence of Investment and Financing Decisions 
According to positive economic theory, the objective of the firm 
is to maximize owners' utility from wealth. Because of the impracticality 
of designing a model that maximizes owners' utility, the maximum market 
value of the firm is pursued, therefore, as a surrogate goal. The price 
of shares on the market depends on the firm's major decision variables: 
the investment and financing decisions.^
The investment decision deals with the asset side of the balance 
sheet as a stock and with operating income as a flow. The financing de­
cision encompasses the manner in which funds are obtained to Implement 
the investment decision. The dichotomy of decisions arises from a tradi­
tion of partial-equilibrlum analysis in which the two decision variables
2
are separately manipulated in search of their respective optimal levels.
In the theory of finance dividend policy is surrounded with con­
troversy as much as leverage. To Modigliani and Miller dividend policy 
is a mere detail except for tax considerations. See Merton H. Miller and 
Franco Modigliani, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares," 
Journal of Business, XXXIV (October, 1961), 411-433. According to Gordon, 
dividend policy is a third major decision variable. See Myron J. Gordon, 
"The Savings, Investment, and Valuation of a Corporation," Review of Econ­
omics and Statistics, XLIV (February, 1962), 49-50. In the opinion of 
Walter, retention of earnings for reinvestment is an active decision vari­
able, and the payment of dividends is a passive residual. Refer to James
E. Walter, "Dividend Policy, Its Influence on the Value of the Enterprise," 
Journal of Finance, XVIII (May, 1963), 280-291. In this paper, the divi­
dend policy is treated as a subset of the financing decision.
2
Economic models based on assumptions of perfect and general mar­
ket equilibrium treat the investment decision and the financing decision 
as dicbotomcu.s variables. The two cases in point are Modigliani and 
MiiJer's leverage - Independence hypothesis and Tobin's Separation Theorem 
encountered in the theory of capital markets. For mure detail, refer to 
Modigliani and Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corooration Finance and the 
Theory of Investment," 261-297 and James Tobin, "Liquidity Preference as 
a Behavior Towards Risk," Review of Economic Studies, XXIV (February, 1958), 
65-86.
The separation of the two decisions is more apparent than real. 
The investment decision of the firm cannot be treated separately from 
its financing decision. The simultaneity of the two decisions calls for 
casting them in a setting of general equilibrium where the interdepend­
ence between the investment and financing decisions is explicitly recog­
nized. Lemer and Carlton acknowledge this interdependence of decisions 
by incorporating their LC and FC functions in the dividend valuation mo-
3
del. The LC function portrays the investment decision in imperfect in­
put and output markets and is the equivalent of the familiar marginal 
efficiency of capital. The FC function with its positive slope expresses 
the imperfect market conditions surrounding the financing decision. A 
simultaneous solution for the two decision variables maximizes the value 
of the firm.
In recognition of the interdependence between the investment and 
financing decisions, a general equilibrium model .was suggested in place 
of a naive partial-equilibrium approach. When economic analysis abandons 
a model of perfect markets with its simplistic assumption of certainty, 
conditions of uncertainty become important considerations in making deci­
sions. On the basis of the dichotomy of decisions cited earlier, condi­
tions of uncertainty facing the firm can be partitioned as business risk
When market imperfections are acknowledged, the entity theory of value or 
the independence of investment and financing decisions no longer holds.
For a representative example of the traditional school, see Ezra Solomon, 
"Leverage and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance. XVIII (May, 1963).
3
For a general equilibrium approach of the investment and financing 
decisions, refer to Eugene M, Lemer and Willard T. Carleton, A Theory of 
Financial Analysis, (New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1966), 179-202, 
and Yusuke Horiguichi, "Corporate Financial Decisions General Equilibrium 
Approach" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Rice University, 1971), 1-6.
14
and financial risk. However, the two elements of risk are inseparable.
Business risk is generated by the investment decision and is 
determined by the probability distribution of operating income. From 
the perspective of economic theory, operating Income can be disaggre­
gated into the nature of the input and output markets in which the firm 
participates, or the demand and supply situations facing it. A related 
view in the theory of finance would separate the variability of operat­
ing income into its constituent elements of operating revenue and oper­
ating cost. By means of such a detailed analysis more insight can be 
achieved about the behavior of operating income. The distinction made 
between an "economic" and a "financial" perception of the components of 
operating income pertains more to nomenclature than substance. Since 
the portfolio of the firm's assets is primarily responsible for gener­
ating operating income, the quality of these assets also can be held 
to reflect the quality of earnings with regard to variability.
The third view of business risk uses the concept of the industry 
as a frame of reference. Although the classification of firms into in­
dustrial categories is based on the physical characteristics of outputs, 
the industry is frequently used as an equivalent-risk surrogate. This 
line of reasoning rests on the homogeneity postulate. The homogeneity 
assumption asserts that the operating incomes of firms in an industry 
have nearly perfect positive covariances. A more realistic view recognizes 
differences in business risk among firms but considers inter-industry dif­
ferences to be more significant. The latter approach is implicit in
15
Sharpe's dichotomy of systematic and unsystematic risk.^ The shortcom­
ings of the industry approach to business risk in general, and with re­
gard to conglomerate firms in particular, will be pointed out subsequently. 
The variability of operating income will be adopted as an operational def­
inition of business risk throughout this paper.
Broadly viewed, the financing decision under conditions of uncer­
tainty determines the manner in which risks and returns attending invest­
ment decisions are distributed among the various suppliers of capital. 
Although the analysis of financial risk is complicated by the order of 
priority of capital suppliers, behavioral assumptions, and tax treatment, 
risk invariably arises from the investment decision. However, in most of 
the literature, financial risk is treated as a function of leverage. This 
straited conception uses stockholders as a frame of reference in both de­
cisions and does not imply that the return of an all-equity capital struc­
ture is risk-free. Whereas the introduction of more leverage increases 
both risk and return to stockholders, a total withdrawal of leverage will 
not reduce the risk inherent in the investment decision. Having established 
a general interdependence between investment and financing under conditions 
of uncertainty, attention can next be diverted to specifying the direction 
of change between operating risk and financial leverage.
Inverse Relationship between Business Risk and Leverage 
The financing decision of the firm can be partitioned in a number
The basis of Sharpe's dichotomy of risk is that some elements of 
uncertainty underlie the whole market and are not diversifiable. Unsys­
tematic risk, on the other hand, is peculiar to a given industry or a given 
firm and can be eliminated with diversification. See William F. Sharpe, 
Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company,
1970), 96-98.
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of ways: debt and equity, internal and external, short-term and long­
term, and variable and fixed-cost sources. The leverage subset of the 
financing decision and the manner of its relationship with the invest­
ment decision under conditions of risk is the principal concern of this 
paper. The two underlying premises of leverage analysis, shared by both 
the antagonists and the protagonists of optimal capital structure, are 
general risk-aversion prevailing in capital markets and the different 
tax treatment of debt and equity financing. The fact that various in­
struments of financing (used in different proportions by different firms) 
carry associated costs is a reflection of general risk-aversion by in­
vestors. Within this framework, two aspects of the leverage issue can 
be delineated. The first part of the leverage problem is concerned with 
whether or not the use of leverage exerts some influence on the value 
of the firm. The second part deals with an attempt to identify a unique
point or range of optimal leverage.
In a world of perfect capital markets and no taxes, the doctrinal 
controversy over the optimality of capital structure is still far from 
resolved. The leverage issue has divided scholars in the field of theo­
retical finance into two camps. The opposing views are the leverage- 
independence hypothesis with Modigliani and Miller (hereafter M & M) as
the chief spokesmen, and the so-called traditional school.^
The essence of the dissension over optimal leverage addresses 
itself to whether or not the value of the firm is independent of its
The traditional school does not have a designated standard banner 
carrier like Modigliani and Killer and will include all those who reject 
the leverage-independence hypothesis on both theoretical and empirical 
grounds.
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capital structure. To proceed along the main line of inquiry with minimal 
digression, it is unnecessary to revive, a complete account of the "great 
debate." In fact, when the restrictive assumptions embraced by the lever­
age-independence proposition are dismantled, the contention between the 
two camps vanishes. In this regard, this paper takes a traditionalist 
stance.
In the remainder of this section the inverse relationship between 
business risk and the leverage ratio will be explained with a particular
emphasis on the behavioral assumptions posited by the "leverage-dependence"
, 6 
argument.
The following notations will be used:
A = Market value of total operating assets
S = Market value of total equity
= A random variable for return on operating assets
= Probability of occurrence of the i*"^  random event
= A random variable for return on equity
Rj = Fixed interest charge corresponding to different 
degrees of leverage (d = o, -- 1)
E(R) = Expected return
L = Leverage ratio (L =
L* = Optimal leverage
= Return on a leverage-free capital .structure
2
0 (R) ■ Variance of return
For the underlying assumptions of the leverage-dependence hypo­
thesis refer to Glen A. Mumey, Theory of Financial Structure (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1969), 115-121 and Ezra Solomon, Trie 
Theory of Financial Management (New York: Columbia University Press,
1963), 91-118.
1 a
The effect of taxes will be assumed away and a simple capital 
structure consisting of one form of equity and debt will be assumed. The 
liberties taken in these assumptions are dictated by the need for minimal 
digression. Given the investment decision by the probability distribution 
of return on assets, the following four equations specify the risk and re­
turn dimensions of assets and equity:
Expected return on assets:
n
E(R®) = E R?P
i-1
(2-1)
Variance of return on assets:
a^(R®)
n
E
i»l
rJ - E(R® (2-2)
Expected return on equity :
(2-3)
Variance of returns on equity:
o^(R") (2-4)
Equation (2-3) requires some elaboration. To circumvent the 
multiple steps necessary to compute expected return on equity, interest 
charges on debt (R^) are expressed in terms of total assets. In addi­
tion to the mathematical convenience, this view of interest is justified
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by the notion of cost of capital as the required rate of return on assets. 
The term (R^) is not a random variable, but the subscript (d) is used to 
denote interest charges corresponding to varying levels of leverage.
Having specified the risk and return measures of assets and equity, 
attention can now be devoted to examining the interplay of the investment 
and leverage decisions. Beginning with an all-equity capital structure 
and in the assumed case of no taxes, the ordered pairs of returns and var­
iances in (2-1) and (2-2) are equal to the pairs of returns and variances 
in (2-3) and (2-4).  ^ It is to be noted that the equality of operating 
risk and return to risk and return on equity is a demonstration of the 
fact that financial risk does not exist under circumstances where the cap­
ital structure is not levered. In such cases, the variability of equity 
return is only due to operating risk Inherent in the Investment decision.
When debt is introduced into the capital structure, equalities 
between the ordered pairs of risk and return cease to hold. Inequality 
between the variance of operating return and the variance of equity re­
turn signals the emergence of financial risk accompanying the use of le­
verage. Increases in leverage are reflected in the changing values of
â A
interest charge (R^) and the leverage ratio (^ ) in Equation (2-3), hold­
ing the scale of operation constant.
7 â
In an all equity capital structure A = S and ■ 0. Substitut­
ing these values in (2-3), the following equality emerges:
Repeating the same procedure:
o^(R®) » o^(R®)
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Increase in equity return, induced by the use of more leverage, 
is easily explained. As long as the rate of return on investments is 
greater than the cost of debt, return on equity will increase with more 
utilization of leverage. With reference to Equation (2-3), and assuming 
no change in the rate of interest, the expected return on equity (E(R®)) 
is an increasing function of the leverage ratio (^). Implicit in the 
preceding statement is the additional assumption that the investment 
decision as specified by the probability distribution of operating re­
turns, in Equations (2-1) and (2-2), remains the same. The assumption 
pertaining to the apparent independence of interest rates and leverage 
will be relaxed after the variance of equity return has been examined.
The variance of equity return is defined in Equation (2-4). As 
shown in the equation, since the variance of equity return is partly de­
pendent on the expected value of equity return, a rise in the latter is 
accompanied by a corresponding rise in the former. When the probability 
distribution of operating returns is held constant, it is to be noted 
that the underlying cause of both changes in equity risk and return is 
the increased use of leverage. Return on equity and its dispersion will 
increase simultaneously with additional leverage in a manner shown in the 
following expression:
> 0 (2-5)
dL
In addition to the terms of trade between risk and return, the value of
8 2 8
the firm is partly dependent on relative changes in E(R ) and a (R ) with 
respect to leverage. This point will be pursued further after considering
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the interaction between interest rates and leverage.
In the preceding discussion, the response of equity risk and re­
turn to leverage was explained without allowing for possible rise in in­
terest rate as leverage increases. The assumption that the rate of inter­
est is invariant with leverage is only valid within a limited range. 
Provided that each random variable for operating return (R®) is greater 
than or equal to fixed interest charges corresponding to different de­
grees of leverage (R^), there is no conceivable reason to expect a rise 
in interest rates due to leverage. The inequality in (2-6) stipulates 
the condition for preventing increases in the marginal rate of interest 
within moderate bounds of leverage:
R® i rJ (2-6)
From the view point of creditors, as long as the sense of the 
above inequality is not violated, interest on debt is the equivalent of 
return on a riskless investment. However, the interest charged on debt 
is not a risk-free rate, but a certainty-equivalent of expected interest 
after allowing for lenders* risk. Since the rate of interest has been 
adjusted for a moderate risk of default, the use of more leverage can be 
slightly extended beyond the limits set by the inequality in (2-6), with­
out causing increase in the marginal rate of interest. When a moderate 
amount of debt in the capital structure is surpassed, the rate of inter­
est becomes an increasing function of leverage. Unless equity yield is 
simultaneously examined, the interaction between Interest rates and the 
capital structure is merely a partial picture of the valuation process.
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As pointed out earlier, equity return and its variance change in 
the same direction. The general direction of change between leverage
g
and the two variables is nowhere disputed. The main controversy over 
leverage and valuation pertains to rates of change in equity risk and 
return with respect to leverage, and particularly to the value imputed 
to the trade-off between risk and return. Without some basis for speci­
fying the rate of change in the two dependent variables, with respect to 
leverage, the effect of capital structure on the value of the firm re­
mains a moot question. Even if the two rates were somehow known, the 
effect of leverage on valuation cannot be assessed unless the price of 
"reward-to-variability" is defined.^
Both the opponents and the proponents of optimal capital struc­
ture circumvent the problem of valuation and leverage by introducing be­
havioral assumptions which are exogenous to the interaction of equity 
risk and return with leverage. According to the leverage-independence
g
A direct relationship between equity yield and financial lever­
age has always been a point of truce between the leverage-independence 
hypothesis and the traditional proposition. Ibid., 108 and Fred Arditti, 
"Risk and the Required Return on Equity," Journal of Finance, XXII (March, 
1967), 19-36.
9
In this context, reward-to-variability refers to the ratio;
E(R®) - R’
The numerator is the difference in equity return between a levered and a 
non-levered capital structure. The negative term in the numerator refers 
to equity return that is free from financial risk. This concept was used 
by Sharpe in evaluating the performance of mutual funds. In his study, 
ex-post data was used for equity risk and return, and the risk-free rate 
of interest for the negative term in the numerator. The higher the ratio 
(0), the better the performance of the mutual fund. For more detail refer 
to William F. Sharpe. "Mutual Fund Performance," Journal of Business, XXXIX 
(January, 1966), 119-138.
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hypothesis, the effect of increase in equity return is exactly counter­
balanced by the effect of increase in equity variance so that the value 
of the firm is kept invariant with leverage. Stated differently, in­
creases in earnings per share are exactly offset by decreases in the earn­
ings' multiplier at all levels of leverage. The advocates of the leverage- 
independence hypothesis, therefore, maintain that the value of the firm is 
independent of leverage.
The traditional theory denies the leverage-independence hypothesis 
by contending that investors have different preferences for different de­
grees of leverage. In instances where leverage is too much or too little, 
the market imputes opportunity cost to improper capital structure by rais­
ing equity yield or, what is the equivalent, by lowering the earnings' 
multiplier. According to the traditional view, three degrees of financial 
leverage can be identified: deficient leverage ( L , optimal leverage
(L^), and excessive leverage (L^). Figure (2-1) portrays the effect of 
leverage on the value of the firm.
When leverage is excessive, investors perceive the net effect as 
unfavorable because the disadvantage of increased financial risk outweighs 
the benefits of higher return. Beyond the point or range of optimal cap­
ital structure, each increment of the leverage ratio is accompanied by a 
disproportionate change in earnings per share and its multiplier such that 
the relative rise of the former is less than Che relative decline of the 
latter. A glance at Fig. (2-1) would suggest that if has been surpassed, 
a reasonable action would be to unlever the capital structure to the point 
of optimality.
In the range of L^, the increased use of leverage is favorable to
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FIGURE 2-1. Effect of Leverage on the Value of the Firm
equity value. Below L^, each addition of the debt-equity ratio adds more 
to equity return than financial risk. Although equity yield will rise 
slightly due to increased variance, it does not rise fast enough to off­
set increases in return. A management intent on maximizing the value of 
the firm will increasingly lever the capital structure as long as the terms 
of trade between risk and return are favorable to equity value. The in­
creased use of leverage should stop at the point L^ where the marginal 
rate of substitution between equity risk and return is in equilibrium. 
Hence, the traditional theory of capital structure affirms that leverage 
exerts a definite influence on equity value and that optimal leverage lies 
in the intermediate zone between defficient and excessive leverage. In
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addition, the traditional position states that an optimal leverage, such 
as L^, is uniquely associated with the given investment decision.
In the preceding analysis, the investment decision, described by 
the probability distribution of operating returns, was held constant. By 
holding expected operating return and its variance the same, the leverage 
ratio was varied in search of optimal capital structure. To study the 
direction of change between operating risk and leverage, it is necessary 
to alter the investment decision so that the response of optimal leverage 
can be observed once again. Repeating the foregoing exercise is intended 
to accomplish two purposes. First, in an operating risk-leverage space, 
at least two points are required to form opinion about the direction of 
change between the two variables. Second, the result of the observation 
has an important implication for examining the effect of conglomerate di­
versification on capital structure which Is the main thesis of this paper. 
With these two considerations in mind, the probability distribution of 
operating returns will be changed so that the variance of operating re­
turns is lower than in Equation (2-2). No change in the level of the ex­
pected operating return (E(R^)) will be assumed. Retaining the earlier 
set of assumptions and following the same line of reasoning, a new point 
of optimal leverage will emerge such that:
> li (2-7)
0 o
Holding the level of expected operating returns constant, the second in­
vestment decision was changed to allow more compactness in operating risk 
in relation to the first:
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a^(Ra>2 < a^(R®)^ (2-8)
From the sense of the Inequalities in (2-7) and (2-8), the relationship 
between operating risk and financial leverage may be generalized as in­
verse:
There are a number of studies attesting to optimal capital struc­
ture. These studies show significant differences in inter-industry capi­
tal structure, and a definite pattern in the differences is evident.
If a cross section of industries were ordered in terms of operating risk, 
the corresponding optimal leverage would emerge in an inverse fashion. 
More than a precise form of relationship, the general change of direction 
between operating risk and leverage is of special interest in this paper.
Before concluding this section, it would be appropriate to be 
explicit about what has been implicit in the foregoing discussion. If 
an inverse relationship between operating risk and leverage is theoreti­
cally sound and empirically defensible, a case can be made for explaining 
the advantage or conglomerate mergers in terms of financial leverage.
As a conglomerate engages in a series of acquisitions in unrelated in­
dustries, the process of diversification is reflected in progressively 
stabler operating returns. The increased stability of operating earnings
For example, see Ronald F. Wippem, "Financial Structure and the 
Value of the Firm," Journal of Finance, XXI (December, 1966), 615-633 and 
David F. Scott, "An Inquiry Into the Existence of Optimum Financial Struc­
ture" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Florida, 1970), 103- 
170.
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will enable the firm to push its optimal leverage to successively higher 
points. The leverage induced by diversification is hereafter designated 
as the "leverage implication of portfolio effect." The secondary objec­
tive of this paper is to examine the inverse relationship between operat­
ing risk and leverage in (2-10) by studying conglomerate diversification 
and its leverage responses as a special case.
Current State of Conglomerate Merger Theory 
There is a broad concensus over economic forces that induce ver­
tical and horizontal mergers. The reasons frequently cited are monopoly 
power and economies of scale. A great deal of uncertainty prevails with 
regard to the economic gains of conglomerate mergers. An unsatisfactory 
theory of conglomerate mergers is evidenced by the conjectural nature of 
existing views. In this section, an attempt will be made to classify the 
fragmented explanations of the conglomerate phenomenon and to evaluate 
them in the light of other forms of growth.
At one extreme, the very need of the conglomerate form of organi­
zation is questioned under the title of the risk-independence hypothesis. 
The point of departure in this view Is the quest for the maximization of 
the value of stockholders’ equity. This goal can be accomplished by in­
creasing returns, reducing risk, or both. The prospects of increasing 
return are considered to be the result of scale economies which are more 
in the domain of vertical and horizontal mergers. In a setting of perfect 
capital markets, the reduction of risk can be achieved by substituting
^^Tlaim Levy and Marshall Samat, "Diversification, Portfolio An­
alysis and the Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers," Journal of Finance, 
XXV (September, 1970), 795-802.
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personal portfolios for the securities of a conglomerate firm. By assum­
ing away market imperfections and synergistic effects, the benefits of 
the conglomerate form of economic organization are denied. This argument 
is pursued within a framework of portfolio theory. Therefore, a detailed 
presentation of the risk-independence hypothesis is deferred to the latter 
part of this chapter.
The other polar position on conglomerate mergers accepts growth 
across Industrial lines as given, and then attempts to rationalize the 
flurry of conglomerate mergers during the last merger wave. This group 
of views may be broadly classified as the growth- maximization and the 
profit-maximization hypotheses. In conventional economic theory, profit 
maximization is invariably taken for granted in explaining the behavior 
of the firm. The profit-maximization hypothesis subsumes no separation 
of ownership and control or accepts the compatibility of managers' and 
owners' interests. In the light of the growing separation of ownership 
and stewardship, a conflict of interest between managers and owners is con­
sidered to be a logical consequence.
Following this development, the growth-maximization hypothesis 
is posed as a direct challenge to the profit-maximization hypothesis.
Since the gain of market power and synergism is more strongly identified
with other forms of economic integration, conglomerate firms are often
12
cited to Bubstnatiate the growth-maximization thesis. Both in scope
12
Tlie growth-maximization thesis alleges that both the pecuniary 
reward and the non-pecuniary satisfaction of managers is directly related 
to growth in size. For a theoretical discussion of this view, see Dennis 
C. Mueller, "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," Quarterly Journal of Econ­
omics, LXXXIII (November, 1969), 643-660. For an attempt to substnatiate 
the thesis with a study of conglomerate mergers, refer to Reid, Mergers, 
Managers,and the Economy. 117-207.
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and tone, conglomerate mergers as a means of achieving bigness in size 
only, with no consideration for growth in profit, falls outside the li­
mits defined for this study.
Host of the items in the following discussion proceed from profit 
as the operating premise of conglomerate firms. Beginning at the very top 
of the operating performance statement, mergers are justified if they can 
Increase revenue by gaining market power. Conglomerate mergers are very 
unlikely candidates as a source of monopoly power for obvious reasons. 
Economic theory is in general agreement that the potential for monopoly 
power belongs to other forms of consolidation. However, predatory pricing 
or the "deep pocket hypothesis" is suggested as a possible source of mon­
opoly p o w e r . T h e r e  is no evidence supporting the exercise of predatory 
pricing by conglomerate firms. Even if feasible, the deep pocket hypo­
thesis is not a cause but a consequence of conglomeration. Moreover, 
according to the principle of comparative advantage, the potentials for 
monopoly power belong to other types of mergers.
The next logical point of reference on the operating statement
13
With regard to the competitive effects of pure conglomerate mer­
gers, conflicting views are prevalent. Some of the consequences are con­
sidered to be harmful to competition and others are considered to enhance 
competition. The anticompetitive effects are suggested in the form of 
four hypotheses: predatory pricing or the deep pocket hypothesis, mutual
forbearance, reciprocal buying and the leading firm acquisition hypothesis. 
The procompetitive effects are suggested in the toehold theory. These 
opposing views on the competitive effect of conglomerate mergers are merely 
conjectural. There is no empirical evidence supporting either point of 
view. For more detail, refer to F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure 
and Economic Performance (Chicago: Rand McAnally and Company, 1970), 273-
283 and U. S., Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Conglomerate 
Merger Performance: An Empirical Analysis of Nine Corporations. 87-127.
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is cost. If a conglomerate’s opportunities are not based on the possession 
of monopoly power, potentials for a reduction of cost is offered as a just­
ification for the incidence of mergers. Technological economies, manageri­
al economies, and financial economies are often mentioned under the general
14
name of synergism as sources of efficiency In cost. The three economies 
are apparently related to size. Whereas technological and managerial econ­
omies are a function of scale, there is some subtlety to financial econo­
mies which has a particular significance within the context of conglomer­
ate mergers. This subtlety emanates from a joint consideration of size 
and risk, and will be elaborated under the appropriate title subsequently.
Synergism Is a concept loosely used In advancing positions both 
for and against conglomerate mergers, and requires clarification. Total 
synergy can be partitioned Into Its operating and financial components. 
These economies are also known as operating leverage and financial lever­
age, and are a result of the structure of the firm's costs with fixed and 
variable elements. A common measure of operating leverage compares rela­
tive change in operating income to relative change In sales. The result­
ing coefficient Is known as the degree of operating leverage. The coeffi­
cient of operating leverage Is Independent of the financing decision. The 
degree of financial leverage is obtained by dividing relative change in 
operating Income before taxes by relative change In operating Income before 
financial charges.
Mueller, "A Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," 650-651 and Michael 
Gort, "Diversification, Mergers and Profits," In William W. Alberts and Joe 
Segall (eds.), The Corporate Merger (Chicago : University of Chicago Press,
1967), 33-35.
^^In the measurement of the coefficient of financial leverage
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The coefficient of financial leverage reflects the financing de­
cision. Financial leverage takes over from operating leverage. For this 
reason, their internal structure is characterized in sequence as first- 
stage leverage and second-stage leverage. Without decomposing "total syn­
ergy" into its two stages, the differential effects of operating and fi­
nancial leverage on the form of merger cannot be fully appreciated. The 
use of synergism in its generic sense is the common failure of those ar­
guments that appeal to synergistic effects as a justification for conglo- 
merage mergers.
Now, the question arises if conglomerate mergers are susceptible 
to operating leverage. On the basis of the measure of operating leverage, 
if changes in sales are accompanied by a more-than-proportionate change 
in operating income, there is valid ground to suspect positive contribu­
tion of operating s y n e r g y . T h e  likelihood of operating synergy for 
conglomerate mergers can be judged by viewing technological and managerial 
economies separately, coupled with a distinction between plants and firms. 
If conglomerate mergers entail diverse products using different technolo­
gies, the advantage of technological economies is not easily discernable 
at the plant level. However, opportunities for realizing efficiency
earnings before taxes (EBT), earnings after taxes (EAT), and earnings per 
share (EPS) are used in the numerator interchangeably. In order to ex­
clude the effects of stock splits, stock dividends, rights options, and 
changes in tax rates, earnings before taxes (EBT) is preferred as an un­
biased measure of the numerator.
^^It should be noted that a disproportionate change between re­
venues and operating costs can also be attributed to Imperfections in the 
product and factor markets. Therefore, the coefficient of operating le­
verage can be free of the influence of market imperfections only if unit 
selling price and unit variable costs remain unchanged.
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deriving from managerial economies seems to be feasible. This is parti­
cularly true in instances where management is regarded as an amorphous 
factor which can be applied to diverse lines of business. The operating 
leverage of conglomeration lies at the firm level. Whether or not this 
in itself is strong enough to warrant conglomerate mergers is frequently 
disputed by invoking antitrust legislation against other forms of consoli­
dation. Aside from legal considerations, vertical and horizontal mergers 
can be distinguished from conglomerate mergers by a higher coefficient of 
operating leverage. A priori, a higher coefficient of financial lever­
age is a distinguishing feature of conglomerate mergers relative to intra­
industry union, because conglomerate diversification is expected to cre­
ate more debt capacity. A detailed account of the thesis that corporate 
diversification calls for adjustment in capital structure will be covered 
later.
The fact that horizontal and vertical mergers are legally restrained 
does not necessarily imply that operating economies will be achieved by 
conglomerage mergers. The evidence cited in a study by the Federal Trade 
Commission suggests that operating economies for conglomerate mergers 
are more apparent than real.^^ According to this study, conglomerate firms 
make so little change in the administrative functions of the firms they 
acquire that operating economies are minimal. Post-merger centralization 
of managerial functions are considered to correspond to more operating 
economies. The acquired firms of the surveyed companies remained largely
^^Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Conglomerate Merger
Performance, 14-43.
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decentralized. A measure of operating leverage employed by the FTC is 
based on a simple frequency count of changes in organizational and admin­
istrative functions. Due to its qualitative nature, this evidence should 
be taken with some reservations.
Some economists argue that firms search for profitable opportuni-
18 —
ties, even if it means entering an unfamiliar industry. m i s  proposi­
tion will be summarized with the aid of Figure (2-2). MCC is the capital
RATE OF 
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FIGURE 2-2. Shift in the Marginal Efficiency of Capital as a Reason 
for Diversification.
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Gort, "Divcrsification. Mergers and Profits," 38-39-
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supply curve, and MRR is the investment opportunity curve. and are 
the pre-merger and the post-merger levels of investment, respectively.
When a firm finds profitable opportunities higher than the average of what 
is available from the existing portfolio of assets, acquisitions in di­
verse industries will take place. The result of this action is reflected 
in the shift of the profit opportunity curve from HRR^  ^to MRR^» It is not 
necessary to give a list of the factors that cause a shift in the invest­
ment opportunity curve, but it must be emphasized that these forces are
19
not necessarily related to synergistic effects.
No one will dispute the desirability of pursuing higher profits 
through diversification. But when the acquired company originates in a 
sector characterized by easy entry, the high rates of return become a 
short-run phenomenon. If diversification is pursued with long-run objec­
tives in mind, considerations other than short-run profit objectives must 
be given more importance to justify inter-industry mergers. Moreover, 
the pursuit of higher profits by all legitimate means is a prescribed and 
accepted goal for the firm. The principle applies to all forms of growth 
with comparable appeal. The proposition of diversification to enter pro­
fitable industries is the equivalent of invoking a general capital budget­
ing process to validate an isolated case. The above argument, while valid, 
is not overwhelming to justify conglomerate mergers in itself.
The most frequent— and in this researcher's opinion the most per­
suasive— explanation of conglomerate mergers is the pursuit of diversifi-
19
For a detailed enumeration of causes of shift in the investment 
curve, refer to John C. Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Competition 
(Los Angeles; University of California Press, 1967), 64-67.
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cation. In some instances, financial economies or financial leverage
are offered as separate explanations. In this study increased use of
leverage is treated as a by-product of diversification. In economic
theory, diversification is sometimes explained in terms of cross-elasti-
20
city and resource-mobility. By far the most popular analogue of diver­
sification is the old adage of warning against putting all eggs in one 
basket. This ancient homily derives from the likelihood of adverse and 
random events confronting different industries at the same time. The 
hazards of random events can be reduced by spreading a firm's investments 
across industry lines. The concept of diversification is relatively 
straight-forward, but a measure of the extent of diversification or the 
degree of insulation against risk is elusive.
Many studies concerning inter-industry differences of risk- 
related variables treat risk as if it is given by the nature of the in­
dustry. This approach to risk entails a definite limitation because the 
notion of industry based on the Standard Industrial Classification system 
is oriented towards similar physical characterisitcs. For example, in
20If the cross elasticity between two products is high, the pro­
ducts are close substitutes and belong to similar markets. Therefore, 
the higher the cross elasticity, the less diversified the products and 
the markets. When productive inputs can be shifted around between differ­
ent outputs, the products are perceived as similar from the point of view 
08 suppliers. Therefore, a high resource mobility is an indication of 
operation within the same industry although products are sold in diverse 
markets. Ease in resource mobility from the supply side coupled with 
diverse markets from the demand side is like having the best of the two 
worlds. A view of diversification in terms of factor mobility and pro­
duct cross-elasticities is oriented towards the physical characteristics 
of outputs and productive inputs. Investment in products with high cross­
elasticity is similar to investment in products with high positive co- 
variances. See Michael Gort, Diversification and Integration in American 
Industry (Princeton; Princeton University Press, 1962), 8-9.
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empirical investigation of interindustry differences in capital structure, 
these limitations are present, but they are less severe when firms in dif­
ferent industries are not held to Interact. On the other hand, in situa­
tions where the interplay of industries is ever present the problem of 
risk measurement becomes formidable. Past measurements of diversifica­
tion were based on the multiplicity and heterogeneity of product lines or
21
markets entered by conglomerate firms. The extent of diversification 
was gauged by the number of industrial categories in which a conglomerate 
firm operated plants. A simple frequency count of industrial categories 
implies equal weighting factors, which is hardly the case. Heterogeneity 
of product lines presumably indicates the extent of dissimilarity between 
physical products. In the context of risk analysis, the notion of hetero­
geneous products is not a useful concept, unless risk magnitudes are indi­
cated in an ordinal or cardinal sense. Another major shortcoming of the 
industry approach to risk is the total disregard for explicit risk-inter- 
dependence when firms in different industries are brought together as in 
conglomerate mergers. Although naive diversification can be both defi­
cient and superfluous, one thing can be said in its favor: it is still
22
better to diversify than not to diversify. In light of these simplistic 
measures of diversification, an alternative guide to conglomerate decisions 
is critically needed, and the most likely candidate is the portfolio
21
Ibid., 9-11. The fourth chapter of the FTC report also uses SIC 
product categories and digit details in the measurement of diversification. 
See Federal Trade Commission, Economic Report on Conglomerate Merger Per­
formance , 87-128.
22
The implicit condition of this assertion is that a decline in 
expected return is not compromised, and that the subsidiaries of the con­
glomerate firm are characterized by less than perfect positive covariances.
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technique.
Portfolio Analysis of Securities 
The genesis of portfolio theory can, perhaps, be traced back to 
the agrarian society when man first learned not to put all hla eggs In 
one basket. Although this ancient wisdom is as old as the discipline 
of economics its conteaq>orary economic impact was not fully captured un­
til It was given a formal mathematical treatment in 1952. The man given
unanimous credit for raising diversification to a scientific status Is 
23
Harry Markowitz. Markowitz rejected the maximization of expected re­
turn as uni-dimensional and, therefore, inconsistent with utility maxi­
mization. He dismissed the "eggs and baskets" approach to diversification 
as naive and proposed a more efficient rule. A rational Investment be­
havior was redefined as the maximization of utility, or its equivalent, 
the optimization of a trade-off between risk and return.
In this section, the merits of the portfolio approach to risk an­
alysis are listed and explained using securities as decision variables. 
First, the structure of a basic portfolio problem is in order:
Expected portfolio return:
n
E(R®) - Z X.E(rJ) (2-10)
P i-1 ^ ^
Harry Markowitz, "Portfolio Selection," Journal of Finance, VII 
(March, 1952), 77-91. There is no dispute that it was Markowitz who re­
vived and popularized portfolio theory, but the origin of risk analysis 
can be pushed further back to the trorks of Daniel Bernoulli in the early 
eighteenth century.
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Portfolio variance :
a^(R®) = I L X X p(R® )0(R®)a(R®) (2-11)
P 1=1 j=l ] J ^
Subject to;
Z X^ = 1 and X^ k 0 (2-12)
Where:
E(R^) = expected return of security 1
E(Rp) = expected portfolio return
o^(R^) = variance of return of security i
a^(Rp = variance of portfolio return
p(R*j) = correlations between securities i and j 
Xj^  = proportion of investment in security i 
j = 1, 2
i = 1, 2 ... n
First, unlike the qualitative view of diversification, relevant variables 
or portfolio inputs are isolated and more precisely quantified. The in­
puts of a portfolio consist of expected returns, variances of returns, 
and covariances between returns. These parameters are obtained from 
security analysis which presages portfolio analysis. For a portfolio of
Criticisms have been levelled against portfolio analysis for 
disregarding higher statistical moments such as skewness and kurtosis and 
for giving equal importance to upward and downward variances. See Jack 
Clark Francis and Stephen H. Archer, Portfolio Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971), 211-227.
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2
n securities, n expected returns, n variances, and (n - n)/2) covari-
25
ances or correlation coefficients are required.
Second, in sharp contrast with naive diversification, inter­
dependence between variables is explicitly recognized. As indicated 
in (2-10), a portfolio return is linearly related to its decision vari­
ables. It is evident from (2-11) that portfolio risk is quadratic.
Stated differently, portfolio return is additive whereas portfolio risk 
is multiplicative. Because of its special significance to the analysis 
of conglomerate mergers, in the context of the thesis advanced in this 
paper, more attention will be given to the risk dimension of a portfolio.
The extent of a portfolio's synergistic effects depends on the 
parameters of the critical inputs: variances of returns, covariances be­
tween returns, and values assigned to the decision variables. At one 
extreme, the variance of the portfolio can be eliminated— reduced to 
o^(Rp) = 0. To eliminate portfolio variance, the three necessary condi­
tions are perfect negative correlations between the returns of each se­
curity, identical variances of returns, and equal levels of participation 
by each security. For example, if the right-hand member of Equation (2-11) 
is expanded for a two-security case, the two-security portfolio variance
25
On the basis of interrelationships between securities returns 
through common indices, Sharpe has proposed a simplified model for port­
folio analysis. The diagonal model reduces substantially the number of 
covariances needed, and renders economical both the task of security an­
alysis and portfolio analysis. It is not known as yet whether the compu­
tational efficiency of index models more than offset the accuracy of the 
comprehensive full covariance Markowitz approach. See William F. Sharpe, 
"A Simplified Model for Portfolio Analysis," Management Science, IX 
(January, 1963), 277-293 and Kalman J. Cohen and Jerry A. Pogue, "An Em­
pirical Evaluation of Alternative Portfolio Selection Models," Journal 
of Business, XL (April, 1967), 166-193.
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will emerge in the form of the following equation;
o^(Rp) = x V ( R ® )  + (1-X)V(R2> + 2X(1-X)o (R®)o (R®)p (R®^2> (2-13)
The right-hand side of (2-13) can reduce to zero if the sum of 
the first two terms is equal to the third term, but opposite in sign. To 
satisfy a zero solution to (2-13), the three conditions stipulated in 
terms of variances, correlations, and participation levels must be met.
At the other extreme, the variance of the portfolio can be the 
sum of the weighted average of each security's participation level and 
variance, as shown in (2-14) :
o^(R®) - Z X.o^(R®) (2-14)
P i»l ^ ^
To satisfy (2-14), the two required conditions are perfect positive cor­
relations between the returns of each security and Identical variance 
of returns. It should be noted that for Equation (2-14) to hold, equality 
of investment proportions in each security of the portfolio is not ne­
cessary. Hence, portfolio variance is a linear function of the propor­
tions invested in each security, provided that the two conditions with 
respect to correlations and variances are satisfied. In the two asset 
case, if one of the investments is a riskless asset. Equation (2-14) re­
mains unviolated. This final observation is a mere restatement of the 
linearity of the capital market line which is the locus of combinations 
of the market portfolio and lending-borrowing at the risk-free rate of 
interest. Instances of eliminating portfolio risk or keeping portfolio
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risk as a weighted average of its components' variances would amount to
overextending the logic of diversification. The two theoretical cases
26
are neither feasible, nor, in the case of the latter, desirable. Re­
ality invariably lies between opposite poles and symbolically.
Z X,a^(R?) ^ of(R*) i 0 (2-15)
i=l 1 1 P
Expression (2-15) defines the upper and lower bounds of portfolio vari­
ance.
Third, in juxtaposition with a simple frequency count of invest­
ment in unrelated industries, portfolio analysis defines exact standardb 
of efficient diversification. According to the efficiency maxim, a port­
folio is efficient if it attains the highest return for its risk class, 
or if it attains the lowest risk for its return class. In Figure (2-3), 
the curve EF portrays these properties of efficient sets of portfolios 
where EFABCD circumscribes the feasible region. Efficient sets of port­
folios, along EF, can be generated by using different procedures : the
MRP (maximum return portfolio) approach, the MVP (minimum variable port­
folio) approach, the QP (quadratic programming)alogarithm, and simplified 
27
models. The MVP procedure will be used for illustration.
26
Diversification can reduce risk only to its systematic level 
and not below. The technique is potent only against unsystematic or di- 
versifiable risk. No amount of diversification can reduce systematic risk 
to its lower limit as indicated in (2-15). See William F. Sharpe, "Capi­
tal Assets Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of
Risk," Journal of Finance. XIX (September, 1964), 436-442.
27
For a summary comparison of the different tools of portfolio 
analysis refer to Francis and Archer. Portfolio Analysis, 78-107.
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E(R)
a^R)
FIGURE 2-3. The Efficient Frontier in Risk-Retum Space
The structure of a basic portfolio problem was given by the ex­
pressions (2-10) through (2-12). Combining the three expressions, the
Lagrangian objective function of the risk-minimization problem with a
*
desired return constraint E(R) is given by
n n n * ~n
Z = Z Z 
i=l j=l
X^X^p(R^j)a(R^)o(Rj) + Z X E(R ) - E(R) 
1=1
+ ^2 Z X - 1 
i=l
(2-16)
The minimum-risk portfolio for successively predetermined retum-classes 
is found by setting
3Z
3X.
3Z (2-17)
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Fourth, portfolio theory specifies a decision rule for selecting 
one efficient portfolio from a wide range of choices. In essence, port­
folio selection consists of reconciling one of the multitude of efficient
28
portfolios with individual utility preference for risk. With reference 
to Figure (2-4) portfolio selection amounts to isolating a unique loca­
tion on the efficient frontier, such as U, where describes an inventor's 
indifference curve between risk and return. The point of tangency (U), 
between the efficient frontier and an investor's indifference curve, is 
the point of compatibility between a unique optimal portfolio and the in­
vestor's attitude towards risk.
In the preceding paragraphs, the essential elements of the port­
folio approach to diversification were reviewed using securities as de­
cision variables and a portfolio of securities as the frame of reference.
In the following section, a portfolio approach to conglomerate diversifi­
cation will be examined. Hence, a "conglomerate portfolio" will replace 
a portfolio of securities, and firms will be the relevant decision vari­
ables instead of securities.
Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Mergers
The original and widespread use of the portfolio approach was 
limited to the analysis, selection, revision, and evaluation of combina­
tions of securities. Portfolio theory is such a fundamental guide to
28
The theory, in the form of the Separation Theorem, recommends 
that all investors should hold the market portfolio. Individual differ­
ences with regard to attitude towards risk should be adjusted by lending 
or borrowing at the risk free rate of interest. This portfolio selection 
rule is in sharpe contrast to the traditional "interior decorator" ap­
proach. See Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets, 70-73.
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all decisions involving probabilistic and interrelated outcomes that its 
potentials transcend the narrow scope of analyzing combinations of capi­
ta] assets only. As a tribute to the generality of portfolio theory, 
Sharpe observed: "If the Markowitz approach is useful in the context of
security selection it must be useful in (almost all areas of finance and
9 0
most areas of business administration)«" A portfolio framework has
been suggested for the selection of capital projects and conglomerate
30
merger decisions, as special cases of the general portfolio theory.
A portfolio of securities can be considered as a merger of securi­
ties and a merger as a portfolio of firms. A different view of the firm 
would be to regard it as a portfolio of securities with identical ex­
pected returns, identical variances of returns, and perfect positive co- 
variances of returns. Similarly, a conglomerate is a portfolio of firms 
with their respective expected returns, variances, and covariances. If 
all the assumptions of portfolio analysis were duplicated for the con­
glomerate case, the selection of firms for acquisition would be akin to 
the selection of a portfolio of securities and the following expressions 
would describe the formulation of the merger problem:
Expected operating return of a conglomerate portfolio in the 
absence of synergistic effects:
29
William F. Sharpe, "Portfolio Analysis," Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis. II (June, 1967), 81.
James C. Van Home, "Capital Budgeting Decisions Involving 
Combinations of Risky Investments," Management Science, XIII (October, 
1966), 84-92 and Keith V. Smith and John C. Schreiner, "A Portfolio 
Analysis of Conglomerate Diversification," Journal of Finance, XXIV 
(June, 1969), 413-427.
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n
E(rJ) = Z X.E(R^) (2-18)
c 1=1 ^ ^
Variance of a conglomerate portfolio;
o^(R*) = E E X,X,p(Rj.)a(Rf)a(R®) (2-19)
^ 4=1 4=1 ^ J ^ J1=1 j=l 
Subject to;
n
E X = 1 and X > 0 (2-20)
i=l
This view of conglomerate diversification in which firms as decision 
variables are treated as if they were perfectly divisible is here desig­
nated as Case One.
As indicated earlier, the analysis of conglomerate diversifica­
tion within a framework of portfolio theory is a special case of the 
"general theory." Pondering the implications of portfolio theory for 
conglomerate mergers offers useful insights into such decisions and broadens 
the applicability of the theory. But some of the assumptions underlying 
the general theory must be carefully screened in studying special cases 
such as merger decisions. The two sets of assumptions forming the basis 
of portfolio theory are those governing the behavior of investors and 
those referring to the nature of securities or decision variables. No 
objection is raised here to the former group of assumptions. But to re­
plicate the second set of assumptions, in the analysis of conglomerate 
mergers using the portfolio approach, would amount to a total disregard
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for real differences between the nature of firms and that of securities 
as decision variables of their respective portfolios.
A decision variable, whether a security or a firm, is a distinct 
entity. Its uniqueness is defined by its expected returns, variance of 
returns, and in relation to other decision variables, by its covariances. 
The three attributes of a decision variable, representing the parameters 
of portfolio inputs, are uncontrollable factors. Determining the level 
of participation of decision variables is the only controllable variable 
in portfolio analysis. The power of the decision maker consists of nam­
ing a tentative list of portfolio candidates and solving for optimal 
proportions of investment in each decision variable.
The dissimilarities between a portfolio analysis of securities 
and that of mergers can be delineated by focusing on constraints govern­
ing the two types of portfolios, both Implicitly and explicitly. Whereas 
the securities of all publicly held corporations constitute the universe 
from which a portfolio of securities can be selected, the scope of pro­
spective acquisitions by a conglomerate firm are generally limited. A 
portfolio of securities can Include International Business Machines, 
American Telephone and Telegraph, General Motors, or any of the dominant 
firms in different industries. A conglomerate acquisition of these giants 
is very unlikely. In addition to the overwhelming size of many firms and 
the prohibitive funding necessary to acquire them, anti-trust restraints 
would exclude many firms from a list of potential acquisitions.
The capital market, where the decision variables of a portfolio 
of securities are traded, is the institution closest to the theoretical 
construct of perfect markets. Firms can be bought and sold in the open
47
market via public offering. But the market for firms is a far cry from 
organized stock exchange. An efficient capital market facilitates the 
selection and revision of portfolios. An inefficient "firms market" 
hampers the acquisition and disposition of firms.
One of the explicit assumptions of portfolio analysis is the per­
fect divisibility of securities as decision variables. Theoretically, 
any number of securities can be bought and sold, including fractional 
securities. Securities are in fact reasonably divisible, if not perfectly. 
The fact that securities are issued in small denominations gives a charac­
ter of flexibility to securities as decision variables. Indivisibility 
is one of the limiting features of a portfolio approach to capital budget­
ing and merger decisions. In view of the lumpiness of capital projects,
Weingartner has proposed an integer constraint which prevents a fractional
31
solution to problems involving stochastic and interrelated projects. 
Equivalently, if conglomerate acquisitions require total interest in po­
tential subsidiaries, the structure of the portfolio problem described 
as Case One in Equations (2-18) through (2-20) may be modified in the 
following manner:
Expected operating return of conglomerate portfolio in the absence 
of synergistic effects
n
E(R*) =. Z X, E(R®) (2-21)
^ i-1 1 ^
^Hlartin Weingartner, "Capital Budgeting of Interrelated Projects: 
Survey and Synthesis," Management Science, XII (March, 1966), 491-504.
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variance of conglomerate portfolio
of(R*) = I Z X.X,p(R®,)a(Rj)a(R®) (2-22)
i=l j-l  ^J ^ J
subject to
n K.v.
^ - 1 and 0 < X^ = < 1 (2-23)
i=l
I K  V = V < W (2-24)
i=l
= 0 or 1 (2-25)
where
X^ = proportion of investment in the 1^^ subsidiary 
= the i^^ subsidiary 
v^ = market value of the i*"^  subsidiary 
V = total amount invested in acquisitions 
W = total funds available for acquisitions
The constraint in (2-25) precludes fractional firms from considera­
tion in an optimal solution. An integer requirement transforms the struc­
ture of the portfolio problem and its solution procedure from quadratic 
programming to quadratic-integer programming. Hence, the efficient sets 
of portfolios take the form of optimal lists of firms, in contrast with op­
timal proportions of firms under Case One. However^optimal proportions of
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investments are indirectly obtained as shown in Equations (2-23) and 
(2-24). A portfolio analysis of conglomerate diversification where com­
plete control of prospective acquisitions is required by imposing an in­
teger constraint on the objective function is here termed Case Two.
In the selection of statistically interdependent portfolio of
capital projects, an integer constraint is inescapable. A portfolio
framework for capital projects is further complicated by physical inter-
32
dependence, such as contingency and mutual exclusion. In view of anti­
trust considerations, the latter factor may influence merger decisions 
including conglomerate mergers. A case in point is an antitrust suit 
involving LTV acquisitions of Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Okonite Company, 
and Braniff. This case is cited in Chapter Four.
Assuming no antitrust guidelines are violated, potential candi­
dates for a conglomerate portfolio may be treated as physically independ­
ent. If control rather than full ownership of a subsidiary is the require­
ment of acquisition policy, the integer condition in (2-25) may be relaxed.
The fraction of controlling interest in a firm largely depends on how widely the 
shares of the company in question are distributed. However, a fifty-one 
percent ownership of outstanding common stock guarantees a definite con­
trol, irrespective of how widely or closely shares of a company are distri­
buted. A portfolio analysis of merger decisions in which a minimum con­
trolling interest of fifty-one percent is required of all potential acqui­
sitions is here referred to as Case Three. The structure of the correspond­
ing portfolio problem appears as follows:
^^Ibid.
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Expected portfolio return in the absence of synergistic effects
a n
E(R*) =» Z X, E(R7) (2-26)
i-1 ^ ^
variance of conglomerate portfolio
a^(R®) = Z Z X,X,p(Rf,)a(R®)a(R®) (2-27)
subject to
n K V
Z X^ - 1 and 0 < X^ - < 1 (2-28)
i-l
Z K V - V < W (2-29)
i-l ^ ^
1 i i 0.51 (2-30)
The stipulation in (2-30) should not be confused with lower limit 
requirements of participation levels in the conglomerate portfolio. As 
specified in (2-28), optimal participation levels (X^) depend on optimal 
controlling interests (K^), the market value of each firm (V^), and the 
aggregate market value of an efficient portfolio (V). The condition in 
(2-30) insures that the twin objectives of diversification and control 
are simultaneously satisfied.
In preceding discussion three types of conglomerate diversification
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problems were formulated within a framework of portfolio analysis. The 
three cases of divisibility considered were perfect divisibility (Case 
One), imperfect divisibility (Case Three), and perfect indivisibility 
(Case Two). The different degrees of divisibility were explicitly shown 
by attaching side conditions to the objective function of the conglomer­
ate portfolio problem. Having presented the structure of the three pro­
blems, attention can now be diverted to an assessment of how the indivi­
sibility of firms might affect the resulting efficiency of conglomerate 
diversification.
Sharpe has emphasized that portfolio problems differ only to the
33
extent of side conditions imposed on the objective function. An inter­
pretation of this view would indicate that the efficiency of portfolio 
diversification depends on the degree of imperfection of the decision 
variables composing the portfolio. Decision variables are considered 
Imperfect if they are less susceptible to manipulation by way of portfo­
lio analysis. The three cases of divisibility were an indication of im­
perfection of firms as decision variables in merger analysis. Only by 
applying conditions to the objective pursued can the solution to a port­
folio analysis of conglomerate mergers yield realistic economic meaning. 
Imperfect decision variables, such as firms and capital projects, have a 
tendency to limit the area of the feasible region and the height of the
34
efficient frontier of their respective portfolios in a risk-retum space.
In general, the more perfect or divisible the decision variables, the more
33
Sharpe, Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets, 59. 
^^Ibid.. 65.
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efficient the corresponding portfolios, and the larger the size of the 
feasible region.
Figure (2-4) portrays the efficiency of diversification under 
three degrees of divisibility;
E(R)
o (R)
FIGURE 2-4. Efficiency of Diversification Under Three Degrees of 
Divisibility
More specifically, the figure refers to the three cases discussed earlier, 
and numerically designated as Case One, Case Two, and Case Three. The 
identifying number of each efficient frontier relates to the three cases, 
respectively. The right hand borders of the feasible region (ABCDEF) are 
commonly shared by the three cases, because the portfolio analysis uses 
the same inputs for each case of divisibility. The efficient frontier (1) 
envelopes the other two because Case One is unconstrained as to divisibi­
lity. The efficient frontier (2) is enveloped by the other two because
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Case Two is constrained by integer requirements. The intermediate posi­
tion of the efficient sets (3) is easily inferred from the preceding ex­
planations. The three cases are superimposed in order to simplify the 
task of comparing the effect of different merger policies on conglomerate 
diversification.
The conglomerate portfolio problem under Case One was character­
ized by omitting restrictions on the proportion of investments in each 
firm. The decision variables (X^) were allowed to assume any positive 
magnitude subject to the stipulation that the sum of the proportions could 
not exceed one hundred percent. Under Case One, the level of participa­
tion is independent of the market value of firms and availability of funds, 
because each firm entering the conglomerate portfolio is treated as if it 
were perfectly divisible. Although void of realism, the broad range of 
values that participation levels may assume enhances the efficiency of di­
versification under Case One, and the resulting efficient frontier (1) re­
flects the advantages of divisibility in a portfolio analysis of conglo­
merate diversification. The dominance of the efficient frontier (1) over 
(3) and (2) will be clear after the remaining two cases have been examined.
A portfolio analysis of conglomerate mergers under Case Two does 
not require the solution procedure to yield optimal proportions of invest­
ment in the portfolio. The objective function is conditioned by integer 
constraints, and the optimal solution to the portfolio problem appears in 
the form of an "efficient list" of firms. The level of participation in 
each firm (X^) is merely a by-product. If n firms are involved in the 
merger analysis with integer constraints, the total number of attainable 
sets will be 2". Since some portfolios will dominate others, the number
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of the efficient sets will be less— perhaps very considerably less— than 
the number of the feasible sets.
In Figure (2-4) the efficient frontier of Case Two composes part 
of the feasible sets of Case One, whose efficient frontier lies further 
to the left. The indicated hierarchy of the two efficient frontiers is 
possible because the quadratic programming solution under Case One can 
accomodate the efficient sets generated by integer-quadratic programming 
under Case Two. The structure of the portfolio problem under Case Two 
can be transformed into portfolio analysis under Case One by dropping the 
integer requirement. If the efficient list of firms obtained from Case 
Two, which yielded the efficient frontier (2), is used as the input under 
Case One, a new efficient frontier (1) will emerge. It can be general­
ized, therefore, that the efficient frontier under Case One dominates the
35
efficient frontier under Case Two.
The intermediate position of the efficient frontier (3) can be 
argued by following the preceding line of reasoning. Under Case Three, 
the proportion of investment in firms composing the conglomerate portfolio 
can assume any value provided that two requirements are satisfied. First, 
the sum of fractional investments in each firm cannot exceed unity. Second,
35
The three alternative approaches to a portfolio analysis of con­
glomerate diversification implicitly assume that parameters of the decision 
variables remain the same. The only difference among the three alterna­
tives is the degree of divisibility of firms as decision variables. Indir­
ectly, the three efficient frontiers rank the efficient sets of portfolios 
of securities, portfolios of firms, and portfolios of capital projects. As 
for the dominance of the efficient frontiers of securities portfolio over 
that of firms, the evidence is indicated in a comparative study of mutual 
funds and conglomerate firms. See Smith and Schreiner, "A Portfolio Analy­
sis of Conglomerate Diversification," 420 and Randolph Westerfield, "A Note 
on the Measurement of Conglomerate Diversification," Journal of Finance,
XXV (September, 1970), 912.
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the proportion of investment in each firm must be more than fifty-one 
percent of its corresponding market value. Because of the emphasis of 
a minimal controlling interest, a portfolio analysis of mergers, under 
Case Three, is not independent of the market value of firms being con­
sidered for the conglomerate portfolio. Cases Two and Three are similar 
in one respect: their respective portfolios do not include less than
fifty-one percent of candidate firms. But the similarity ends here. 
Whereas the portfolio under Case Three consists of fractional firms in 
excess of fifty-one percent of their respective market values, the port­
folio under Case Three accepts only whole firms. Given differences in 
covariances between the operating returns of firms, it is very likely 
that the efficient frontier generated under Case Three will dominate 
the efficient frontier under Case Two, and will be dominated by portfolios 
under Case One, because the divisibility of Case Two is hindred by integer 
requirements. The dominance of the efficient sets under Case One over 
those under Case Three is brought about by the perfect divisibility of 
firms under the former case. Thus, there is a sound theoretical basis 
for the arrangement of the three efficient frontiers corresponding to 
three cases of divisibility, in Figure (2-4).
No portfolio, securities included, may achieve efficient diversi­
fication in a Markowitz sense because theoretical portfolio analysis does 
not allow for transaction costs and indivisibilities. Even securities, 
in spite of their small denominations, are not perfectly divisible. The 
highest efficient frontier in Figure (2-4) does not remotely approximate 
the diversification potentials and the acquisition policy of conglomerate 
firms. A practical usefulness of portfolio analysis of conglomerate
diversification designated as Case One is, therefore, precluded on both 
grounds of divisibility and control.
The lowest efficient frontier in Figure (2-4) is a result of an 
overemphasis placed on controlling potential subsidiaries. The order of 
priority of such policy is control first and diversification second. It 
is no wonder, therefore, that Case Two with its integer constraints should 
yield the lowest efficient sets of portfolios. Justifications for a mer­
ger policy that treat diversification as secondary can only be sought out­
side the realm of portfolio analysis.
A portfolio analysis of the merger problem, labelled as Case Three, 
strikes a tenable balance between corporate control and corporate diversi­
fication. The policy premise of the intermediate efficient frontier in 
Figure (2-4) is that a fifty-one percent interest is the minimal require­
ment to guarantee control in potential subsidiaries. An acquisition policy 
that requires wholly-owned subsidiaries is inefficient. It adds little to 
control, but it takes away from diversification. If diversification and 
control are of equal importance, a portfolio approach to merger decisions 
referred to as Case Three is both feasible and desirable.
Redundancy of Conglomerate Mergers
In an earlier discussion, one of the extreme views on conglomerate 
mergers referred to as the risk-independence hypothesis was briefly men­
tioned. This hypothesis challenges the necessity of conglomerate business 
consolidations as a means of achieving diversification. Ideally, a detailed 
account of this thesis best follows a general treatment of portfolio analy­
sis as it relates to mergers. Having examined a portfolio analysis of
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securities and firms in the preceding two sections, the risk-independence 
hypothesis can now be presented within a portfolio framework.
Given less than perfect positive covariances between expected 
returns, the concavity of the two lower efficient frontiers in Figure (2-5) 
suggests that there is a definite economic gain from conglomerate diversi­
fication. The risk-independence hypothesis is not in dispute with this
possibility, but stresses that the same result can be achieved without mer- 
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gers. For the convenience of exposition, it will be assumed that the 
capital market consists of three risky assets and one riskless asset. Using 
one of the tools of portfolio analysis cited earlier, the efficient frontier 
can easily be generated. The capital asset pricing model is convenient in 
identifying the market portfolio (M), in Fig. (2-5). Under conditions of 
market equilibrium, the structure of the market portfolio must be propor­
tional to the aggregate market value of the three firms issuing the risky 
37securities.
The claimed redundancy of conglomerate mergers hinges on whether 
or not a portfolio revision following a merger will alter the structure 
of the pre-merger optimal portfolio. To resolve this controversy, two of 
the firms will be allowed to merge and the reaction of the market to the 
merger event by adjusting its portfolio will be observed. The post-merger 
capital market will consist of two risky assets and one riskless asset.
36This section draws heavily from Halm Levy and Marshall Samat, 
"Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case for Conglomer­
ate Mergers," Journal_of_Fin^ XXV (September, 1970), 795-802.
37For the capital market to be In equilibrium there must be a cor­
respondence between the structure of the market portfolio and the relative 
value of firms issuing risky securities. See Eugene F. Fama, "Risk, Return 
and Equilibrium: Some Clarifying Comments," Journal of Finance, XXIII
(March, 1968), 33.
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FIGURE 2-5. Equivalence of Conglomerate Diversification and Diver­
sified Securities in a Perfect Capital Market.
After the merger, the revised and efficient portfolio is different in 
form but the same in content. In a risk-retum space, the market port­
folio (M) in Figure (2-5) does not alter its position. Under the stipu­
lated conditions of market equilibrium, the "new" market portfolio (M')
will be proportional to the relative market value of the two firms mak- 
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ing up the market. It can be demonstrated mathematically that the
proportion invested in the securities of the conglomerate firm is equal
to the sum of the proportions invested in the securities of its component
39
firms prior to the merger. By abstracting from synergistic effects of 
expected returns and under conditions of market equilibrium. Levy and
38
Levy and Samat, "Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the 
Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers," 798.
10
-'"Ibid.
Sarnat concluded that a conglomerate firm cannot accomplish for its stock­
holders what the stockholders cannot do for themselves by diversifying 
their personal portfolios.
Mueller scorns the risk pooling role of conglomerate firms and
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assigns that specialty to a diversified portfolio of securities. If 
the acquiring firm cannot improve its return dimension by means of syn­
ergistic effects and hidden profit opportunities in the acquired firms, 
the stockholders of the acquiring firm can accomplish for themselves 
what the management of the conglomerate firm professes to do for them with 
regard to risk reduction. For the small investor, Mueller recommends 
mutual funds as a more effective avenue to diversified investments.
Michaelson and Goshay contend that the wealth maximizing rule 
does not fully account for the portfolio selection practices of financial 
intermediaries.^^ From a direct analysis of financial intermediaries
they draw implications for conglomerate firms. West counters the opinion
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of Michaelson and Goshay with respect to conglomerate firms. The thrust 
of his argument hinges on the distinction between financial and non- 
financial corporations and whether or not corporate leverage and corporate 
diversification can be duplicated by homemade leverage and homemade port­
folios. For both types of corporations, the substitutability between
^^Mueller, "The Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," 652.
^^Jacob B. Michaelson and Robert C. Goshay, "Portfolio Selection 
in Financial Intermediaries: A New Approach," Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis. II (June, 1967), 195-196.
^^Richard R. West, "Homemade" Diversification vs. Corporate Diver­
sification," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, II (December,
1967), 417-421.
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personal and corporate leverage is considered to be valid. Personal port­
folio is judged to be an effective substitute for corporate diversifica­
tion because the decision variables in question are securities. When the 
decision variables involve real assets, the substitutability between per­
sonal portfolios and conglomerate diversification is rendered dubious.
West attempts to advance a transparently weak justification for conglo­
merate mergers not on the strength of what conglomerate firms can do, but
43
on the seeming weakness of what investors cannot do.
Myers' risk-independence thesis is just another variant of the
44famed leverage-independence argument. The latter argument contends 
that in a perfect capital market the value of a pie is independent of the 
manner in which it is partitioned. The risk-independence view, the con­
verse of the leverage-independence proposition, asserts that in an effi­
cient capital market a combination of pies is equal to the sum of its 
separate pieces, no more, no less. Myers directly addresses the risk-
independence thesis to internal diversification. He then extends his con-
45
elusions to conglomerate mergers as a corollary. Either leverage or 
conglomerate mergers cannot generate disequilibrium in the capital mar­
ket. The corrective mechanism for the leverage-independence thesis is
The expected return of a portfolio of securities is the weighted 
average of the expected returns of the component securities. But the ex­
pected return of a conglomerate portfolio is multiplicative due to a po­
tential for synergism. Investors cannot diversify real assets due to pro­
blems of divisibility and, therefore, cannot realize synergistic effects. 
Ibid.. 419-420.
^^Stewart C. Myers, "Procedures for Capital Budgeting Under Un­
certainty," Industrial Management Review, IX (Spring, 1968), 1-15.
4^Ibid., 10-11.
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the substitution of personal leverage for corporate leverage. The equili­
brating force for the risk-independence proposition is the substitution 
of personal portfolios for conglomerate diversification.
The authorities sampled were nearly unanimous in their conclu­
sions. In the absence of synergistic effects and in perfect capital mar­
kets, substituting a portfolio of firms for a portfolio of securities 
does not serve either a useful or a harmful purpose— it is merely redund­
ant. The conclusion necessarily follows from a premise of capital markets 
and this is hardly surprising to anyone familiar with economic analysis.
But when one moves closer to reality by dropping the setting of perfect 
markets, the portfolio effect of conglomerate mergers ceases to be indis­
putable. The portfolio effect brought about by merger decisions gives 
rise to a leverage response from the financing side. In the following 
section, the leverage implication of the portfolio effect will be examined 
as the exact antithesis of the risk-independence and the leverage-independ­
ence theses.
Leverage Implication of Portfolio Effect
One of the justifications appealed to in explaining the incidence 
of conglomerate mergers is a vague argument generally referred to as po­
tential economies of finance accompanying such mergers. This ambiguity 
takes many forms. First, it is argued that securing and managing capital, 
like other factors of production, is subject to indivisibilities. The 
efficiency of a specialized financial function is warranted provided that 
the operating scale of the firm is large enough. The process of securing 
funds from external sources involves incurring a fixed cost of transactions.
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On unit basis, the fixed cost of transactions is a declining function 
of the magnitude of financing required. The amount of funds needed In 
turn depends on the size of the firm. Therefore, growth in size by 
means of conglomerate mergers enables a firm to reduce the cost of ob­
taining external funds. This line of argument fails to distinguish be­
tween financial economies arising from an adjustment in capital structure 
and economies due to scale effects. The potential for reducing unit trans­
actions cost by increasing the size of the firm exists not because of, but 
in spite of, conglomerate mergers. The economies of finance invoked in
conjunction with conglomerate mergers is a mere restatement of the fami-
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liar economies of scale as a financial case. Second, a related point 
of view suggests that a conglomerate firm has better access to cheaper 
sources of capital than its smaller parts. This argument could be per­
suasive if it were not for the fact that mergers more often take place 
between large firms for whom the capital market is already within reach.
The third interpretation of financial economies refers to the
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existence of suboptimal capital structure in prospective acquisitions.
If the opportunity for reducing financial cost has been overlooked by 
the candidate firms, the acquiring firm will take advantage of unused debt 
capacity. This line of argument would suggest that in instances where 
idle debt capacity is nonexistent, adjustment of leverage following di­
versified acquisitions would be unnecessary.
Assume that two firms A and B, with existing leverage ratios L.
^^Gort, "Diversification, Mergers, and Profits," 34.
^^Wilbur G. Lewellen, "A Pure Financial Rationale for Conglo­
merate Mergers," Journal of Finance, XXVI (May, 1971), 542.
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and Lg, merge to form firm C. The optimal capital structure for the two
it it it *
firms is and Lg. If and Lg = Lg, the optimal leverage of firm
C would appear to be the weighted average of the pre-merger optimal capi­
tal structure;
L* = WL* + (1-W) Lg (2-31)
where, W is the relative size of firm A.
On the other hand, if suboptimal leverage is indicated in one or both firms, 
* *
such that and Lg > Lg, firm C is presented with an opportunity to
correct the unused debt capacity:
L* > WL^ + (1-W) Lg (2-32)
Even if the pre-merger capital structure is optimal, it is maintained 
in this paper that the post-merger optimal leverage will be greater than 
the weighted average of the two optimal capital structures prior to the 
merger:
L* > WL* + (1-W) Lg (2-33)
The situation in (2-28) is induced by a decision to combine two firms 
whose operating earnings are less than perfectly correlated. The ine­
quality in (2-32) is merely an attempt to rectify financial mismanage­
ment that existed before the merger. Steps to utilize idle debt capacity 
are not opportunities contingent upon events of conglomerate mergers.
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But the financial synergy indicated in (2-33) is a direct consequence of 
diversification.
In the preceding discussion, the first two financial explana­
tions of conglomerate mergers were mere extensions of the familiar econ­
omies of scale. The third view suggested that if suboptimal leverage 
decisions were reached by firms to be acquired, the conglomerate firm is 
offered the opportunity to achieve optimal leverage. Lewellen aptly dis­
misses these arguments as mere t a u t o l o g y . T h e  three types of financial 
ecpnomies are neither created by, nor peculiar to, conglomerate mergers.
A final ambiguity requiring some clarification is the distinc­
tion between leveraged portfolios with reference to capital market theory 
and the leverage implication of portfolio effect in the context of con­
glomerate diversification. Figure (2-6) depicts the Markowitz-Tobin-
Sharpe capital asset pricing model and is based on a host of underlying 
49assumptions.
Capital market theory reduces the investment decision to three 
basic options; investment in a riskless asset, investment in the market 
portfolio of risky assets, and investment in some combination of the mar­
ket portfolio and riskless assets. Points R^, Lj^ , and along the capi­
tal market line (CML) portray the three investment choices. The capital 
market line depicts the financing decision. All points to the left of Lg 
along CMI. are lending portfolios and involve negative leverage. Positively
^^Ibld.. 525.
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For assumptions underlying capital market theory, refer to Jack 
Clarke Francis, Investment Analysis and Management (New York; McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, 1972), 444-445.
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FIGURE 2-6, Choice of Leverage According to Risk-Retum Indifference 
Curves in a Perfect Capital Market
leveraged portfolios, or borrowing portfolios, lie to the left of Lg, 
with leverage increasing in a north-easterly direction. The point at 
Lg is an all-equity capital structure and the segment of CML to the left 
of it is the concern of this study.
Figure (2-6) shows a correspondence between the indifference 
curves through and different degrees of leverage L^  ^through L^.
The significance of such portrayal is that leverage decisions are dic­
tated by individual attitudes towards risk. The constant slope of the 
capital market line implies that different degrees of leverage, extreme 
or moderate, do not alter the rate of change between risk and return.
The notion of leveraged portfolios within a framework of market 
equilibrium is the equivalent of the first two propositions posed by
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M & M. Hamada has reconciled Che capital asset pricing model in Figure 
(2-6) and the leverage-independence hypothesis without requiring the ho­
mogeneous risk-class assumption and the arbitrage p r o c e s s . H e  concludes, 
as M & M do and as the separation theorem Indicates, that when Investment 
and financing decisions are dichotomous leverage decisions have no effect - 
on the value of the firm. Hamada concedes that when market imperfections 
are admitted the value of the firm is not independent of capital struc­
ture but he gives most prominence to the tax deductibility of interest 
as a form of government s u b s i d y . T h e  implication of such qualification 
is that in a realistic setting of market disequilibrium, where all in­
vestment units do not hold the market portfolio, investment and leverage 
decisions are not independent. In the context of conglomerate diversifi­
cation, this reservation would further suggest that a portfolio effect 
emanating from an inter-industry combination might have a leverage impli­
cation in terms of Increased debt capacity.
The traditional theory of corporation finance is more explicit 
about predictions pertaining to changes in operating risk and financial 
leverage. Given the behavioral assumptions of the traditional school, 
subscribed to herein, an interrelationship between investment and financ­
ing decisions will manifest itself in the form of an Inverse change be­
tween operating risk and leverage.
A few writers on conglomerate mergers give indications of financial 
leverage as a unique advantage of inter-industry union. Narver refers to
^®Hamada, "Portfolio Analysis, Market Equilibrium and Corporation 
Finance," 16-19.
^Hbid.. 20.
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five economic forces requiring a simultaneous optimization. He charac­
terizes two of these factors as "financial forces making for an optimal 
financial unit" and "forces of risk and fluctuation making for a unit
possessing the greatest power of survival in the face of industrial vicis- 
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situdes." Muller hints, with a cryptic air, a conglomerate advantage 
in the form of an ability to realize hidden economic potentials.'"' These 
hidden economic potentials could be interpreted as reference to the subtle­
ty of financial leverage and the diversification effect from which it de­
rives. Levy and Sarnat deny the advantage of conglomerate diversification 
over personal portfolio of securities in a perfect capital market. But
they acknowledge financial leverage potentials of an inter-industry union
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in an environment of imperfect markets. Due to a reduced dispersion of 
operating income and the resulting decline of lenders' risk subsequent to 
mergers, a modest increase in leverage will not be expected to entail a 
rise in the rate of interest and a fall in the price-earnings ratio.
Lewellen is emphatically explicit about the leverage implication 
of conglomerate m e r g e r s . A f t e r  categorizing the sources of profitable 
external growth as operating and financial in character, he identifies
52The other three forces are technological, managerial, and market­
ing. See Narver, Conglomerate Mergers and Market Competition, 62-63.
^dueller's characterization of hidden economies does not make an 
explicit reference to financial leverage. But hidden economies could be 
interpreted to indicate the subtlety of financial synergy. Mueller, "A 
Theory of Conglomerate Mergers," 654.
^^Levy and Sarnat, "Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the 
Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers," 801.
^^Lewellen, "A Pure Financial Rationale for Conglomerate Mergers,"
521-535.
operating synergy with intra-industry mergers. Other financial consi­
derations such as financial economies of scale and suboptimal leverage 
prior to mergers are assigned secondary Importance because they are not 
peculiar to conglomerate mergers. Lewellen singles out the leverage 
implication of portfolio effect as the most outstanding economic force 
inducing conglomeration:
Its singular fascination lies in the fact that it is 
purely financial in character, is unique to the implementa­
tion of consolidations of enterprises, is available from vir­
tually every merger, and is independent of the presence of any 
of the other possible benefits indicated above. That oppor­
tunity arises from the phenomenon that the juxtaposition with­
in a single firm of the probabilistic income streams from two 
previously separate companies will necessarily yield a result­
ing joint income stream whose diminished relative variability 
will be such as to induce lenders to establish a new aggregate 
limit on lending which can only exceed the sum of the original 
limits established for the two merger partners individually.
Therefore, as long as leverage has, in a world of taxes, a 
beneficial impact on residual equity market values, an expan­
sion of the range of borrowing levels by corporations as an 
automatic byproduct of merger provides a convenient and reli­
able vehicle for the augmentation of shareholder wealth.
Renshaw is equally direct in recognizing the effect of inter-industry di­
versification on post-merger capital structure.
Conclusion
In this chapter, a broad spectrum of pertinent and controversial 
issues surrounding conglomerate mergers were examined. The theory of con­
glomerate mergers was surveyed, and the diversification motive was empha­
sized as the most important economic force inducing inter-industry combi-
5*Ibid., 525.
^^Edward E. Renshaw, "The Theory of Financial Leverage and Con­
glomerate Mergers Californl^_M^agement_Revi^, XI (Fall, 1968), 79-85.
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nation of firms. While the desirability of stabilizing operating earn­
ings and conglomeration as a means of achieving that end was stressed 
the conventional measure of corporate diversification based on a linear 
summation of industries was criticized and a more sophisticated approach 
was proposed.
Throughout the discussion, recognition was given to conflicting 
points of view on corporate diversification and corporate leverage. Ar­
guments that are inclined towards minimizing the diversification effects 
of conglomerate mergers were favorably recognized on the basis of the 
underlying assumptions. But the tendency to be comprehensive about mul­
tiple issues had its drawbacks, in the sense that an uninterrupted de­
velopment of the main thesis was compromised. Finally, Inquiry into 
the leverage implication of the portfolio effect for multi-industry firms 
could be brought into focus without the interference of lateral issues.
Taking the view point of the traditional school of corporate 
finance, it was argued that the investment and the financing decisions 
of the firm are interrelated in a world characterized by uncertainty, 
market imperfections, and taxes. More specifically, if uncertainty in­
herent in the investment decision is reflected in the variability of 
return on assets, the direction of change between operating risk and fi­
nancial leverage was represented to be inverse. Hence, the major pre­
mise of the argument on leverage and diversification derives from the 
position of the traditional school on the interaction of the two variables. 
The proposition that there is a certain quantum of pure financial lever­
age which can be generated by corporate diversification is a mere exten­
sion of the theory of capital structure espoused by the traditional argu­
ment.
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This study, as an inquiry into the dynamics of corporate diversi­
fication and corporate leverage, is characterized by three distinguishing 
features. First, diversification is considered to be the most compelling 
economic justification for the Incidence of conglomerate mergers. Reduced 
reliance on one market, one product, or one technology enables the con­
glomerate firm to achieve a measure of stability in operating returns. The 
process of sustained diversification produces what was earlier termed a 
portfolio effect. Second, the Increased stability of operating returns 
facilitates, or at least should, a leverage response from the financing 
side. Since the Interaction of operating risk and financial leverage 
Is theoretically specified to be an Inverse process, some quantum of In­
creased borrowing capacity Is expected to be Induced by a reduced disper­
sion of operating Income. Third, the portfolio framework Is proposed as 
a superior approach to the analysis of merger decisions. In spite of the 
problems of divisibility discussed earlier and the difficult task of gen­
erating statistical Inputs, portfolio analysis Is a significant advance 
over the commonly used naive approach to corporate diversification.
CHAPTER III 
REVIEW OF SELECTED EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Introduction
Reference to any Index of economic literature would show that em­
pirical analysis of conglomerate firms from the viewpoint of the theory 
of corporation finance is very limited. Although portfolio analysis and 
the theory of capital structure have important implications for examining 
the interaction of corporate diversification and financial leverage, em­
pirical analysis of diversification in these contexts has been neglected. 
The review of selected empirical studies sampled in this chapter consists 
of five papers covering different aspects of conglomerate performance and 
two articles on optimal capital structure.
In a comparative study of firms using different growth strategies, 
Reid reported that conglomerate firms tend to maximize size-related vari­
ables such as sales and assets more than profit-related variables.^  Al­
though conglomerate firms dominated organizations utilizing other types of 
mergers, Reid discounts the profit performance of conglomerate firms as 
merely surendipitous. In two recent papers, Weston-Mansinghka and Rush- 
Melicher reported that the performance of conglomerate firms was average
^Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the Economy, 181-194.
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in relation to other companies in the economy. Whereas Weston and 
Mansinghka emphasize performance at the operating level, Melicher and Rush 
employed multiple indices of performance within a framework of the capital- 
asset-pricing model. The two studies also noted higher use of financial 
leverage by conglomerate firms in comparison with undiversified companies 
for the periods covered in the respective studies. In contrast with the 
methodology of the following chapter in which diversification effects are 
developed and tested, both studies treat the influence of diversification 
on debt capacity qualitatively.
A portfolio analysis of conglomerate firms by Smith and Schreiner 
is the first effort of its kind in which the portfolio approach was used
3
to examine corporate diversification. In an attempt to evaluate the di­
versification potential of conglomerate portfolios, Smith and Schreiner 
compared the performance of mutual funds and conglomerate firms. Using a 
model which was claimed to be an exclusive measure of portfolio diversifi­
cation, in contrast with portfolio management, Smith and Schreiner com­
mended some of the conglomerates for their good diversification record.
On the average, however, mutual funds proved to be better diversified than 
conglomerate firms. Disputing both the merit of the methodology and the 
validity of the empirical results presented by Smith and Schreiner,
Westerfield compared mutual funds and conglomerate firms using an alterna-
2
J. Fred Weston and Surend K. Mansinghka, "Tests of the Efficiency 
Performance of Conglomerate Firms," Journal of Finance, XXVI (September, 
1971), 919-936 and Ronald W. Melicher and David F. Rush, "The Performance 
of Conglomerate Firms: Recent Risk and Return Experience," Journal of
Finance, XXVIII (May, 1973), 381-388.
3
Smith and Schreiner, "A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diver­
sification," 425-444.
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tive approach that separated portfolio diversification and portfolio man- 
4
agement. Westerfield reported that the diversification performance of 
conglomerate firms was overrated by Smith and Schreiner because their in­
dex was an aggregate measure of performance and did not segregate Its com­
ponent elements.
Although the controversy over optimal capital structure remains 
unsettled, a number of empirical investigations have been performed to 
test the alternative hypotheses. A common shortcoming of these studies 
is that most of them use an industry class as the equivalent of homogen­
eous risk. The empirical studies by Scott and tfippem were singled out 
for review primarily because these two depart from the usual assumption 
of equivalent risk class by employing the variability of operating return 
as a surrogate for business risk in a manner similar to the approach of 
this dissertation.^
In the remainder of this chapter, each of the seven select articles 
are reviewed in some detail. In each case, the same pattern of review is 
followed. First, the purpose or the hypothesis of the study is stated. 
Second, the methodology of the study is discussed. Third, the empirical 
results are presented along with their interpretations. At each phase of 
the review, criticisms are interjected and comparisons are made including 
reference to other studies not cited here.
^Westerfield, "A Note on the Measurement of Conglomerate Diversi­
fication," 909-914.
^Scott, "An Inquiry Into the Existence of Optimal Financial Struc­
ture," 95-100 and Wippem, "Financial Structure and the Value of the Firm," 
615-633.
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The Reid Study— Conglomerate Performance 
and Other Growth Strategies 
According to conventional economic theory, the goal of the firm
is defined as the maximization of owners' wealth. The profit maximiza­
tion hypothesis implicitly assumes that the owner and the manager are two 
names for the same entity, or, if the two are dichotomous, their interests 
are compatible. With the progressive separation of ownership and manage­
ment, resulting mainly from the corporate form of organization, the valid­
ity of the profit maximization hypothesis has been increasingly questioned. 
The underlying theory of Reid's empirical study is the possible incongru­
ency of managers' and owners' interests.^ Based on this, Reid hypothesized 
that the type of growth or merger would have differential effects upon in­
dicators of managers' and stockholders' interests. More specifically, Reid 
expected conglomerate mergers to serve the interests of managers more than 
those of stockholders. In accordance with traditional theory of economies 
of scale, he considered inter-industry union of firms to be less amenable 
to the advantages of operating synergy.
Since the interests of stockholders and managers were supposed to
be non-complementary, separate sets of measures were developed for each on 
the basis of profit-related and size-related variables, respectively.^
More than four decades ago, Adolph A. Berle and Gardner C. Means 
made these predictions about an emerging phase of the free enterprise sys­
tem; increased concentration in industrial structure, progressive separa­
tion of ownership and control, and conflict of managerial and ownership 
interests. The third factor stems from the second and Reid sets out to 
test this as his underlying hypothesis. Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the 
Economy, 132 and Adolph A. Berle and Gardner C. Commons, The Modem Corp­
oration and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc.,
1968), 293-309.
^Reid, Mergers, Managers, and the Economy, 181-182.
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Size-related variables used to reflect the interest of managers were rela­
tive changes in assets, sales, and employment. Relative changes in stock 
prices, return on assets after taxes, and the net profit margin were asso­
ciated with the interest of stockholders. From the Fortune list of 500 
largest industrial corporations, 478 firms included in the study were di­
vided into five groups: internal growth firms, firms engaged in horizon­
tal, vertical, circular, and conglomerate mergers. For each category of 
firms, the mean growth rate of the six interest variables were computed 
over the period 1951-1961. The analysis of variance was used to determine 
if there were significant differences in growth rates among the five 
samples.
Conglomerate firms dominated the remaining four groups in all three
g
categories of managers' interest indicators, followed by circular mergers. 
Firms active in vertical mergers exhibited the lowest average growth rate 
in two size-related variables. According to the three measures of growth 
rate in size, significant differences were observed among firms using dif­
ferent growth strategies. The results of Reid's investigation could be in­
terpreted to mean that conglomerate mergers serve the interest of managers 
the most, and vertical mergers the least. These findings are not surpris­
ing in view of the fact that the pattern of external growth during the 
period covered by this study is noted for the dominance of conglomerate 
and circular mergers. However, Reid's inference about manager's interest 
and conglomerate growth does not necessarily follow. In terms of measures
^Ibid., 185. 
^Ibid., 74-75.
of stockholders' interests, the performance of conglomerate firms was only 
second to that of Internal growth firms.Vertically integrated firms 
showed the lowest profit performance Indicating that these firms benefited 
their stockholders the least.
From the viewpoint of stockholders, two of Reid's rate of return 
measures are inappropriate for the purpose they were intended to serve.
Net income as a percent of sales is influenced by such factors as asset 
turnover and the structure of operating cost, and has minimal significance 
in the context of Reid's study. The second approach for measuring stock­
holders interest equates return on assets to return on equity. Return on 
assets would be a valid measure of owners' interest and an acceptable ba­
sis of comparison among the five groups of firms only if all firms had 
an all-equity capital structure, or if their debt-equity ratios were iden­
tical. Reid's analysis makes no reference to differences in leverage of 
firms included in the study. In particular, the absence of allowance for 
capital structure differences harbors a measurement bias against the pro­
fit performance of the conglomerate group. Nevertheless, the performance 
record of these firms was impressive relative to other forms of mergers.
But Reid dismisses the return performance of conglomerate firms as merely 
"serendipitous," and characterizes them as primarily size-maximizers.
The fact that conglomerate firms were noted for high growth rates 
in size-related variables is not a valid ground for inferring that conglo- 
merage firms cater primarily to the interest of managers. Since conglomer-
^°Ibid., 185.
^^Reid, "Reply to the Weston Mansinghka Criticisms Dealing with 
Conglomerate Firms," Journal of Finance, XXVI (September, 1971), 945.
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ate firms were also found to rate high on stockholders' interest variables, 
perhaps a more reasonable explanation would be that conglomerate firms 
serve the interests of both owners and managers well.
The Weston-Mansinghka Study— Efficiency Tests
of Conglomerate Firms
The broad objective of the Weston-Mansinghka (hereafter W-M) paper
was to follow up on Reid's evaluation of conglomerate firms and assess his
results and conclusions in the light of the evidence derived from their 
12
own investigation. The specific task of the W-M study was to examine 
the comparative efficiency performance of conglomerate and non-conglomerate 
firms during the period 1958-1968. The two scholars held that the lower 
growth rate of conglomerate earnings and share prices, as suggested in 
Reid's study, was perhaps due to the early terminal date of the period 
covered by the study, although conglomerate mergers peaked during the sec­
ond half of the 1960's.
To test the hypothesis, W-M selected a total of 189 firms and di­
vided them into three equal groups consisting of conglomerate firms, in­
dustrial firms, and a combined group of industrial and non-industrial firms. 
The last two were randomly selected and served as control groups. The con­
glomerate sample was chosen on the basis of a minimum growth rate of twenty 
percent by means of acquisitions during 1960-1968. In addition, these 
firms were required to be active in ten or more three-digit, or five or 
more two-digit, SIC categories in 1968. The analysis of variance was used
12
Weston and Mansinghka, "Tests of the Efficiency Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms," 920-921.
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to compare the three groups of finrs in terms of growth and earnings per­
formance.
In the first part of the study, the average growth rate of sever­
al financial variables were computed and tested for statistical signifi­
cance. These variables included total assets, sales, net income, earnings 
per share, and prices per share. In all instances, the mean growth rate
of conglomerate firms was found to be significantly higher than that of 
13
the control groups. Some of the results confirm Reid's findings with 
regard to managers' interest variables but not his interpretations. How­
ever, W-M do not attach much importance to the observed differential growth 
rates between conglomerate firms and the control samples. The explanation 
offered for their position is that the trend of the five financial vari­
ables is largely influenced by the degree of merger activity. This con­
clusion is slightly oversimplified. Granted, the trend of assets, sales, 
and net income is a function of the rate of expansion, both internal and 
external. But the generalization of W-M does not apply to earnings per 
share and the value of shares, because the trend of the two variables is 
dependent on factors other than the degree of merger activity. Subsequent 
to mergers, the earnings per share of the surviving firm would improve pro­
vided that the price/eamings ratio paid for the acquired firm is less than 
that of the acquiring firm. Moreover, the value of the acquiring firm 
would appreciate if investors evaluate the improved earnings per share at 
the existing or higher price/eamings r a t i o . W i t h o u t  information con-
^^ Ibid., 924-925.
James C. Van Home. Financial Management and Policy (Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968), 473-480.
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cerning exchange ratios between merging firms and the level of the dis­
count rate subsequent to mergers, there is no factual basis for the W-M 
assertion that the trend of earnings per share and prices per share is 
a result of the degree of merger activity.
The second and more Important aspect of the W-M effort involved 
evaluating the three groups of firms using multiple measures of perform­
ance. Several results of the investment and financing decisions were ex­
amined both separately and jointly. These included return on assets be­
fore interest and taxes, debt to net worth, debt and preferred stock to 
equity, return on net worth, return on equity, and the price earnings 
ratio. The sample means of these financial variables were computed in 
1958 and 1968 and examined for significance of differences.
In terms of operating return and return on net worth, the record 
of conglomerate firms was significantly lower than that of the non­
conglomerate sample in 1958. By 1968, the earnings performance of con­
glomerate firms had improved to such an extent that there were no signi­
ficant differences among the means of the three samples. In addition to 
improving their operating return significantly, conglomerate firms achieved 
a moderately higher return on equity than their non-conglomerate counter­
parts. It is often alleged that higher growth rate in the earnings per­
formance of conglomerate firms is due to differential price/eamings ratios 
during acquisitions. Tlie evidence on price/earnings ratios does not lend 
credibility to that point of view. Both in 1958 and 1968, there were no
15
Weston and Mansinghka, "Tests of the Efficiency Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms," 926-927.
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significant differences between the price/eamings ratios of the three 
samples. An explanation of higher gorwth rate in earnings performance 
achieved by conglomerate firms lies in the results of their investment 
and financing decisions. In 1958, the mean leverage ratio of conglom­
erate firms was intermediate between those of industrial firms and the 
combined sample of industrial and non-industrial firms. A decade later, 
a measure of leverage including preferred stock placed conglomerate firms 
in a first position. Over the ten years, conglomerate firms achieved 
the highest growth rate in the use of leverage according to two measures 
in which preferred stock was both included and excluded from the numer­
ator.
On the basis of their empirical analysis, W-M made the following 
conclusions about conglomerate f i r m s . T h e  higher growth rate of con­
glomerate firms in terms of size-related variables such as assets, sales, 
and net income has no particular economic significance as it directly 
correlates with the degree of merger activity. Second, higher growth 
rates in equity return achieved by conglomerate firms is attributed to 
a combination of improvement in operating profitability and the increased 
use of leverage. Third, a significant improvement in operating return 
during a period of intense conglomerate mergers is a strong indication 
that conglomerate firms fulfill an important economic function of rais­
ing and maintaining the profitability of their diversified acquisitions. 
Therefore, conglomerate firms should not be viewed with disfavor for not 
achieving superior performance, but should be commended for defensive di­
versification and average performance comparable to that of other industries
l^ibid., 933-934.
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in the economy.
The effect of diversification on the capital structure of con­
glomerate firms is implied in the empirical results of the W-M study.
During the period covered in the study, the conglomerate sample was noted 
for using significantly more leverage than the control groups. But the 
increased utilization of leverage by conglomerate firms did not entail ap­
preciable differences in the mean price/earnings ratios of the three samples. 
Ordinarily, more financial risk is associated with decline in the price/earn­
ings ratio. In the case of conglomerate firms, the adverse effect of le­
verage on the equity capitalization rate could have been mitigated by the 
portfolio effect arising from conglomerate diversification. But the anal­
ysis of W-M did not include a measure of dispersion about mean operating 
returns. On the other hand, an explicit consideration of variance of op­
erating return and its influence on the leverage capacity of conglomerate 
firms is the distinguishing feature of this dissertation.
The Melicher-Rush Study— Risk and Return 
Performance of Conglomerate Firms 
The purpose of the study was to compare the risk-retum perform­
ance of conglomerate and non-conglomerate firms during the period 1965- 
18
1971; From each group, a sample of forty-five firms were selected from 
the 1971 Fortune list of 1000 largest industrial corporations according 
to two criteria. Each pair of firms across the two samples were required 
to belong to the same industry in 1960. Firms from the non-conglomerate
l^ibid., 926-927.
"""^ Melicher and Rush, "The Performance of Conglomerate Firms: Re­
cent Risk and Return Experience," 381.
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sample were further required to have remained in their respective indu­
stries in 1971.
The investigation of the ninety firms, equally divided between 
conglomerate and non-conglomerate corporations, consisted of two major 
parts. In the first part, each firm's return on assets before interest 
and taxes, return on equity, financial leverage, and price-eamings ratio 
were conqiuted. The two samples were then compared to see if significant 
differences were in evidence with respect to these variables. On the 
basis of before tax and after tax operating return, the non-conglomerate 
sançle was found to have achieved moderately higher performance, but 
these were not significantly different from their conglomerate counter­
parts. In terms of return on equity and financial leverage, significantly 
higher results were noted for the conglomerate sample. The price-eamings 
ratios of conglomerate firms were lower, but these were not significantly 
different from those of non-conglomerate firms.
Melicher and Rush interpret the higher returns on equity and the
lower earning multipliers achieved by conglomerate firms as a reflection
19
of the dual effect of leverage on equity return and financial risk. Al­
though they attribute the low level of price-eamings ratios to a corre­
spondingly high business risk, no evidence is presented to support this 
assertion in terms of some index of operating risk. True, the magnitude 
of the price-eamings ratio is an index of the quality of eamings in 
terms of operating risk, financial risk, and growth prospects. The unsub­
stantiated arguement of Melicher and Rush runs counter to views held with 
regard to the effect of diversification on the stability of operating in-
^^Ibid.. 384.
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come. Moreover, diversification is expected to enable conglomerate firms 
to stretch their leverage capacity without entailing increase in financial 
risk. The results of the Melicher-Rush study is not disputed here. But 
their interpretation of the results is at odds with the leverage implica­
tion of corporate diversification, emphasized in the preceding chapter.
The second part of the Melicher-Rush study was concerned with the
measurement of investment performance, for the most part, on the basis of
20the capital asset pricing model. From the middle of 1966 to the end of 
1971, monthly time series of each firm's equity yield were obtained from 
Standard and Poor's Conq)ustat tapes. For each of the ninety firms, the 
following investment performance measures were computed: average monthly
return over 66 months, standard deviation of returns or total risk, sys­
tematic risk, correlation coefficients between each firm's return and re­
turn on the market portfolio, Jensen's predictability index, Sharpe's
21
reward-to-variability ratio, and Treynor's reward-to-volatility ratio.
On the basis of these variables, the two groups of firms were compared 
and tested for significance of differences. Although not statistically 
significant, slightly higher average return and higher total risk were ob­
served for the conglomerate sample. Risk differences between the two 
samples, according to systematic risk and on the basis of correlation co-
2°Ibid.. 384-387.
21
The market portfolio and the risk free rate of interest were 
approximated by Standard and Poor's 500 Price Index and interest rate on 
sixty-day U. S. Treasury Bills as of the beginning of the month, respec­
tively. Ibid., 384. For an excellent comparison of the Jensen, Sharpe, 
and Treynor Performance indicators refer to Keith V. Smith and Dennis A. 
Tito, "Risk-Retum Measure of Ex-Post Portfolio Performance," Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analvsis. IV (December. 1969). 449-471.
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efficients between individual firms and the market portfolio, were in­
consistent. With respect to the former, conglomerate firms demonstrated 
a significantly higher level of systematic risk. With respect to corre­
lation measures, on the other hand, the conglomerate group was character­
ized by a significantly lower level of risk. This index of risk supports 
the view that conglomerate firms can achieve better diversification per­
formance than their non-conglomerate counterparts. However, a signifi­
cantly higher systematic risk coupled with non-significantly higher return
appears to contradict the theory of capital asset pricing in which a sig-
22
nlfleant and positive correlation Is predicted between risk and return.
In two out of three composite measures of Investment performance, conglo­
merate firms achieved moderately better trade-off between risk and return. 
But differences between the two samples. In terms of the three Indexes, 
were not statistically significant.
Melicher and Rush conclude that on the basis of most evaluation 
tests used in the study, the performance of conglomerate firms was compar­
able to that of non-conglomerate firms. The only outstanding difference 
they found was the greater use of financial leverage by the conglomerate 
sample. However, the use of more debt In the capital structure of conglo­
merate firms is taken to be counter productive due to associated lower 
price/eamings ratios. Nevertheless, according to the theoretical frame­
work of this paper, diversification by conglomerate firms is expected to
22
According to the theory of capital markets, the relationship be­
tween return and systematic risk Is predicted to be both positive and sig­
nificant. Sharpe, "Capital Asset Pricing: A Theory of Market Equilibrium
Under Condition of Risk," 433-442 and John Lintner, "Security Prices, Risk, 
and Maximal Gains from Diversification," Journal of Finance. XX (December, 
1965), 606.
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increase their leverage capacity without entailing a deterioration in 
the quality of eamings.
The Smith-Schreiner Study— A Portfolio Analysis
of Conglomerate Diversification
A unique feature about the Smith-Schrelner (hereafter S-S) paper
is that it is the first attempt to examine conglomerate diversification
23
within a framework of portfolio analysis. The main objective of the S-S 
study was to develop and evaluate a model for the selection of diversified 
industrial categories by conglomerate firms using the portfolio approach. 
The secondary task of their effort was to compare the diversification per­
formance of two samples comprising conglomerate firms and mutual funds.
While recognizing several limiting conditions associated with ap­
plying portfolio analysis to corporate diversification such as: indivisi­
bility, uniqueness of each acquisition, and abandonment, S-S circumvent 
these problems by invoking a homogeneity assumption, which states that
firms in the same industry are nearly the same with regard to business
24
risk characteristics. If some conglomerate firms were known for acquir­
ing companies from the same industry, each acquisition was treated alike 
with respect to risk and return. The S-S approach, for example, would 
disregard the difference between the acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel 
by LTV and investment in another representative firm of the steel industry. 
The merit of this approach, apart from its obvious simplification, is that 
it provides a basis for making comparisons among the sample conglomerates.
23
Smith and Schreiner, "A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Di­
versification," 413-427, 
^^Ibid., 417.
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Having assumed away distinctions between a portfolio of securities 
and a portfolio of firms, S-S chose the Standard and Poor's 88 industrial 
categories as the spectrum of investments open to conglomerate acquisitions. 
By excluding certain industries in which conglomerate firms were not his­
torically known to invest, 67 industrial categories were finally selected 
to represent the conglomerate market portfolio. The risk-retum attri­
butes of these industries were computed from the Standard and Poor's market 
indices of fourteen (1953-1967) price relatives. From a past performance 
of fifteen years, expectations for the following year were approximated 
by means of a simple extrapolation on the basis of which efficient sets 
were generated. The conglomerate market portfolio was identified by assum­
ing a risk-free return of five percent. The S-S model of conglomerate 
portfolio analysis showed that, if the past is a reliable guide to future
expectations, investment in seven industrial categories would yield an
25
optimal portfolio of conglomerate investments.
The second phase of the S-S analysis involved comparing the diver­
sification performance of conglomerate firms with that of mutual funds.
Two non-random samples consisting of nineteen conglomerate firms and eight 
mutual funds were selected for this purpose. Whereas analysis of mutual
25
These industries included soft drinks, cosmetics, drugs, elec­
tronics, publishing, radio and T.V. networks, and telephone and telegraph. 
Although the market portfolio for conglomerate firms consisted of 67 in­
dustries investment, seven select industries yield the same diversifica­
tion result as that of the market portfolio. This result indirectly lends 
support to an earlier study by Evans and Archer in which they demonstrated 
that diversification is governed by diminishing returns. Out of a possible 
portfolio of 470 NYSE securities, 10 to 15 securities were found suffici­
ent to reduce portfolio risk to its systematic level. Portfolio larger 
than these produced redundant results— counter productive considering trans­
actions costs. For more detail, refer to J. Evans and S. H. Archer, "Di­
versification and the Reduction of Dispersion; An Empirical Analysis," 
Journal of Finance, XXIII (December, 1968), 761-767.
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funds was based on actual data, a simulation technique was employed in
the case of conglomerate firms. After computing average returns and
standard deviations for individual conglomerate and investment company,
Sharpe's reward-to-variability composite measure was used to rank the
26
diversification performance of each firm. The results showed that, on
the average, mutual funds achieved better diversification performance
27
than conglomerate firms. However, a few conglomerate firms performed 
better than some mutual funds. When the combined sample of mutual funds 
were ranked according to the Sharpe portfolio performance index, four 
conglomerate firms appeared on the top ten list. Although S-S did not 
perform a test of significance, the comparative advantage of mutual funds 
comes as little surprise since investment companies are organized to pur­
sue portfolio diversification. With due allowance for certain shortcom­
ings in their methodology, equating the firm and the industry in particu­
lar, S-S concluded that some conglomerate firms have succeeded reasonably
well in their diversification performance in relation to some mutual 
28
funds. The S-S model Is claimed to make no allowance for managerial
26
Sharpe's portfolio performance ratio measures risk premium In­
duced by total risk:
where: 0 ■ reward-to-variability ratio
ri - average return on the i^^ portfolio
tf - riskless rate of interest
0 ^ " total risk of the i*-^  portfolio.
The higher the value of 0, the better the diversification performance. 
Sharpe, "Mutual Fund Performance," 119-138.
27
Smith and Schreiner, "Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diver­
sification," 423.
°^Ibld.. 427.
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consideration. An examination of this point is held over to the review 
of the next article.
Aside from obvious differences in the objective of the S-S study 
and an investigation dealing with the leverage implication of the port­
folio effect, one outstanding difference between the two approaches is to 
be noted. S-S assume away the distinction between an industry and a firm 
by employing a convenient homogeneity assumption. In the methodology of 
the following chapter, however, the uniqueness of each acquisition and 
disposition is maintained despite the rigors of obtaining requisite 
financial data.
In the preceding chapter, with particular reference to a port­
folio analysis of conglomerate mergers, the effect of indivisibility on 
the efficiency of diversification was discussed. One aspect of the S-S 
empirical analysis provides interesting insights into this issue and may 
merit closer examination. In the case of two conglomerate firms for 
which proportion of investment in their respective industrial categories 
were unavailable, equal weights were assumed. To examine the sensitivity 
of the empirical results to such assumption, S-S calculated another set 
of the Sharpe performance index for each mutual fund and conglomerate 
firm. For example, if a conglomerate firm or a mutual fund were considered 
to hold a portfolio of ten industries, each industrial category was assigned 
a participation level of ten percent. The results of a sensitivity analy­
sis showed negative changes in the performance index for all mutual funds.
But a degradation of diversification was the case for only a few of the 
29
conglomerate firms. Given the risk and return attributes of different
^^Ibid.. 426.
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industrial categories in which the sample conglomerate firms and mutual 
funds held investments, similar conditions of divisibility improved the 
diversification performance of the former, while affecting the latter 
adversely.
The Westerfield Study— Measurement of
Conglomerate Diversification
In a study concerning the performance of mutual funds, Jensen
has proposed a dichotomy of portfolio performance in terms of efficiency
30
in diversification and efficiency in forecasting security prices. Smith 
and Schreiner referred to the latter component of performance as a "man­
agement variable" and contended that their model of conglomerate portfolio
analysis measures exclusively the diversification prospects of conglomér­
ai
ate firms. Westerfield, on the other hand, disputes the validity of
the S-S model for its intended purpose, contending that their approach is
remiss in that it does not separate the two components of performance:
32
portfolio management and portfolio diversification.
Westerfield's alternate approach to the measurement of conglomer­
ate diversification is developed along the lines of the model for pricing 
capital assets idiich states that the expected return on a portfolio (E(R^)) 
is related to return on a riskless investment (R^), return on the market
30
Michael C. Jensen, "Problems in Selection of Security Portfolios: 
The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964," Journal of 
Finance. XXIII (May, 1968), 389.
31
Smith and Schreiner, "Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diver­
sification," 427.
^Westerfield, "A Note on the Measurement of Conglomerate Diversi­
fication," Journal of Finance, XXV (September, 1970), 908.
on
portfolio (E(R )), and the beta coefficient (B.) which is an index of 
m 1
systematic risk:
E(R^ ) = Rg + E(RJ - Rj (3-1)
Implicit in this equation is a condition of market equilibrium, but if 
there is disequilibrium in the capital market due to the existence of 
over-priced or under-priced securities, the asset pricing model can be 
modified to allow for ability in Identifying such investments by adding 
an alpha term (a^):
E(R^) - E(RJ - Rg (3-2)
The first term in (3-2) may assume a negative or positive value depend­
ing on whether or not the portfolio in question contains under-valued 
or over-valued securities, respectively. The above expression can be re­
conciled with the performance index used by Smith and Schreiner by sub-
2
stituting the definition of systematic risk B^ = p(R^, R^)(;(R^)o(E^)/o (R^) 
into (3-2) and dividing both sides by the total risk a(R^ )^ of the port­
folio:
E(E^) - Rj p(Rj, R^ ) E(R„) - Rj
a(R,) ■ STrT  * ÎTrT  (3-3)
1 1  m
The principal difference between the S-S analysis of conglomerate 
diversification and Westerfield's proposed approach is set forth in Equa-
91
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tion (3-3). The left hand side of the equation represents Sharpe's 
reward-to-variability ratio which is the index claimed by S-S to measure 
portfolio diversification separately from portfolio management. The 
right hand side of (3-3) shows tfesterfleld’s index of performance, seg­
regated into its two elements. The second term depends on correlations 
between any portfolio and the market portfolio. The higher the correla­
tion coefficient between return on a conglomerate portfolio and return on 
a market portfolio, the better the diversification performance of the for­
mer. In the limiting case, if correlations between the two are perfectly 
positive, it means a conglomerate firm has eliminated all diversifiable 
risk by reducing total portfolio risk to its systematic level.
Having separated the effects of portfolio management and portfolio 
diversification on performance, Westerfield proposed as a measure of the 
latter the correlation coefficient between returns on a conglomerate port­
folio and returns on those of the market portfolio. When inefficient 
portfolios are involved, this correlation is influenced by the value of 
the beta coefficient which is noted for its instability due to the exist­
ence of diversifiable risk. To allow for such differences among conglo­
merate firms, the proposed index of diversification was converted to a 
relative measure by dividing p(R^, R^) into the corresponding systematic 
risk. Westerfield's measure of diversification or "total relative risk"
is the same as the ratio of risk on the market portfolio to total risk on
34
a conglomerate portfolio.
To compare his proposed model with that of Smith and Schreiner,
^^Ibid., 910. 
^^Ibid.. 912.
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Westerfield calculated the diversification performance of ten conglomer­
ate firms for two sub-periods during 1954-1968. The same performance in­
dex was also calculated for four mutual funds and 890 common stocks listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange. Several differences in the results of the 
two empirical studies can be observed. Within conglomerate firms, the two 
measures of performance showed inconsistent results. For example, Inter­
national Telephone and Telegraph ranked first in terms of the S-S perform­
ance index, but was rated eighth according to Westerfield’s criterion. 
Contrary to the S-S conclusion about the remarkable diversification per­
formance of conglomerate firms in comparison with mutual funds, Westerfield's 
findings showed that conglomerate firms were outperformed by mutual funds 
during both sub-periods. However, Westerfield's study showed a marked im­
provement in the diversification performance of conglomerates during the 
second sub-period. During the period 1961-1968, conglomerate firms achieved 
better diversification than the average of NYSE stocks.
Differences in portfolio performance, conglomerate firms as well as
others, may arise from portfolio diversification, portfolio management, or
both. Since the methodology of Smith and Schreiner does not separate the
two effects, their observation about the diversification performance of
35conglomerate firms seems untenable. Westerfield's dichotomy of portfolio 
performance^with particular reference to conglomerate firms, is a useful 
contribution to the growing interest in portfolio analysis of conglomerate 
diversification.
^^Ibid., 914.
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The Scott Study— Inquiry Into Optimal
Financial Structure
The primary purpose of Scott's study was to Investigate emplrl-
36
cally whether or not optimal capital structure exists. The secondary 
objective of the study— and the more Important one with reference to the 
present dissertation— Involved determining If leverage differences among 
firms could be explained more meaningfully by the variability of operating 
Income Instead of Industry classes.
The one-way analysis of variance was employed to compare the cap­
ital structure pattern of 77 firms from 12 Industries during the period
1958-1968 using two different approaches : on the basis of Industry class
37
of firms and according to a parameter of operating risk. Utilities 
and railroads were excluded from the sample of Industries to eliminate 
the Influence of regulatory agencies on the capital structure decision of 
the firm. On the basis of book value, the debt/assets ratio was computed 
for each firm annually. The mean leverage ratio of each Industry was then 
tested for statistical significance. The F-test produced evidence sup­
porting the traditional position on Inter-lndustry differences In capital
38
structure at the five percent level of significance. The rejection of 
the null hypothesis was followed up with the pairwise test using the results 
of the analysis of variance. This test confirmed that Inter-lndustry dif­
ferences In capital structure were pervasive.
ture," 2.
37
36
Scott, "An Inquiry Into the Existence of Optimal Financial Struc-
Ibld.. 90-100. 
Ibid., 130-132.
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In the second approach for examining optimality of capital struc­
ture, a parameter of operating risk was used as a criterion for classify­
ing firms Instead of Industrial class. The variability of operating In­
come was measured by the antilog of the standard error of estimate about 
the log rend line and was used as the business risk surrogate. This was 
computed on the basis of two Income streams: per share earnings before
Interest and taxes (EBIT) and per share earnings before depreciation, In­
terest, and taxes (EBDIT). For each firm, three time periods consisting 
of 1959-1968, 1959-1963, and 1964-1968 were analyzed.
Having determined the operating risk characteristics of each firm
six different ways, the 77 firms were assigned to one of the arbitrarily
formed four or five business risk classes ranging from high to low. The
one-way analysis of variance was then performed to determine If there
were significant differences among the mean leverage ratios of firms In
different variability classes. Four F-ratlos for the periods 1964-1968
and 1959-1968 showed no significant differences In the mean leverage ratio
39
of firms In separate variability classes. For the period 1959-1963, 
however, a weak evidence of differences In capital structure was Indicated 
at the twenty-five percent level of significance. These results may cast 
doubt on the traditional theory of finance concerning Interrelationships 
between operating risk and capital structure.
Most empirical analyses about capital structure assume that firms 
In the same Industry belong to a homogeneous risk c l a s s . S c o t t  sets out
^^Ibld.. 162.
^^The classical article by M-M Is based on the same homogeneity 
assumption. Modigliani and Miller,’The Cost of Capital Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment," 266.
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to test the validity of the equivalent risk class proposition as a sec­
ond minor hypothesis. Accordingly, the analysis of variance was performed 
on variability of operating income by industry. The F-test showed that
inter-industry differences in variability were statistically significant
41
at a confidence level ranging from 95 to 75 percent. The pairwise test
substantiated the same conclusion. On the basis of these tests, Scott 
observed that the industrial grouping of firms is a reasonable approxima­
tion of homogeneous risk class.
In his inquiry into the existence of optimal capital structure,
Scott tested three separate hypotheses, the major one being inter-industry 
differences in financial leverage. By using a larger sangle of industries 
and a more refined methodology, in comparison with a related study by
Schwartz and Aronson, Scott provides further evidence in support of the
42
traditional theory of finance on corporate leverage. His first minor
hypothesis concerning the variability of operating return and capital struc­
ture is of particular interest from the perspective of a dissertation which 
attempts to show a relationship between corporate diversification and fi­
nancial leverage. While no dispute is raised here over the merit of Scott's 
methodology, an apparent inconsistency in the interpretation of his results 
cannot be overlooked. The same sample of 77 firms from 12 industries were 
used to test inter-industry differences in capital structure, inter-industry 
differences in the variability of operating income, and inter-variability
^^Scott, "An Inquiry Into the Existence of Optimal Financial Struc­
ture," 155-156.
^^Eli Schwartz and J. Richard Amson, "Some Surrogate Evidence in 
Support of the Concept of Optimal Financial Structure," Journal of Finance, 
XXII (March, 1967), 10-19. '
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differences in capital structure. Scott interprets the results of the 
first two analyses to mean that leverage differences among firms are sig­
nificantly related to their Industrial classification and that firms in
43
the same industry are characterized by equivalence of operating risk.
On the basis of separate evidence regarding the non-significance of dif­
ferences in mean leverage ratio among firms in different variability 
classes, he argues that financial leverage is independent of stability 
in operating income. However, when the results of the two minor hypo­
theses are Interpreted together a double meaning is inevitable. On one 
hand, appreciable differences among industries with respect to variability 
in operating income could mean that the industrial category of firms is 
a good approximation of homogeneous risk class. On the other hand, the 
same result could also be interpreted to suggest that the evidence con­
cerning independence of operating risk and financial leverage is spurious. 
The first interpretation inq>lles the second. However, Scott opts for one 
interpretation and Ignores the other without any allowance for the ambigu­
ity of his results.
The Wlppem Study— Financial Structure and
the Value of the Firm
Both proponents and opponents of the concept of optimal capital
structure share a common ground regarding the direction of change between
44equity yield and financial leverage. Both sides agree that the cost of
^^Scott, "An Inquiry Into the Existence of Optimal Financial Struc­
ture," 178.
A4
There is a widespread consensus both in theoretical analysis and 
empirical evidence. For representative views from each school, refer to 
Modigliani and Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the 
Theory of Investment," 284-288 and Fred J. Weston, "A Test of Cost of Cap­
ital Propositions," Southern Economic Journal, XXX (October, 1963), 105-112.
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equity is an increasing function of leverage. Values predicted for the 
slope of the leverage-yield function is the substance of the dispute about 
leverage effects. Wlppem's study addresses itself to this crucial issue. 
Specifically, the purpose of the study was to examine the effect of lever­
age on the equity capitalization rate by means of multiple regression and
interpret the results of the analysis in the light of the two opposing 
45
views.
From the perspective of this dissertation, the most interesting
feature of Wlppem's investigation is his recognition of the inadequacies
of an industrial category as a proxy for a homogeneous risk class. In lieu
of a homogeneity assumption, relied upon by other investigators of optimal
capital structure, Wlppem used the variability of pre-tax and pre-depreci-
46
ation operating profit as a business risk surrogate. Although the vari­
ability of EBIT is associated with debt capacity, Wlppem adds deprecia­
tion to this income stream to obtain quasi-cash flow before financial 
charge and taxes. The standard error of estimate around a logarithmic 
trend line of the indicated income stream over the previous ten years 
was used as an index of business risk.
Another novel aspect of Wlppem*s work is his specification of a 
more appropriate standard of leverage. In contrast with leverage ratios 
which are based on stock figures, Wlppem employs a flow measure for the 
leverage variable (L), and directly incorporates in the ratio the level of 
earnings (E), the variability of eamings (s), and interest charges (i),
^^Wlppem, "Financial Structure and the Value of the Firm," 617. 
^^Ibid.. 618-619.
as shown below:
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  (3-4)
E - 2b
The right hand side of (3-4) is a modified reciprocal of the familiar 
times-interest-eamed ratio. The numerator (i) consists of interest 
and preferred dividends. The denominator (E - 2s) is a ninety-five per­
cent certainty-equivalent of average eamings. In other words, EBIT be­
fore depreciation was adjusted for business risk within a confidence in­
terval of ninety-five percent by subtracting two standard errors (2s) 
from the average level of income. The explicit consideration of the risk 
factor in the leverage ratio made it unnecessary to rely on the equivalent 
risk assumption for firms in the same industry.
In addition to leverage, three independent variables comprising 
growth, dividend payout, and size were included in the multiple regres­
sions analysis to serve as a control group. Six dummy industry variables 
were also introduced to detect any systematic Influence of the industry 
factor which may remain unexplained by the four independent variables.
The dependent variable, equity cost, was estimated two ways: as earning
48
yield and as dividend yield plus growth rate.
Leverage measures based on stock figures, whether based on mar­
ket value or book value, have been criticized for lacking conceptual merits. 
See J.K.S. Ghandi, "On the Measurement of Leverage," Journal of Finance,
XXI (December, 1966), 715-726.
^^The empirical analysis was based on sample data of 50 firms from 
7 industries. Regression coefficients were computed for four non-consecu- 
tive years (1956, 1958, 1961, 1963) in order to observe the stability of 
the coefficients over time both in sign and magnitude. Wlppem, "Financial 
Structure and the Value of the Firm," 620-621.
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Multiple regression coefficients were computed for a cross sec­
tion of 50 firms from 7 industries, and these were tested for statisti­
cal significance. Empirical results showed that equity yield was dir­
ectly related to leverage and retention and inversely to growth and firm 
49size. On the average, each of these coefficients was significant at 
the five percent level, in the theory or finance, general agreement ex­
ists as to the effects of growth and firm size on the equity capitaliza­
tion rate. Wippem's empirical results are further evidence to the broad 
consensus that the two variables are inversely related to the cost of 
equity. However, some ambivalence is still prevalent, on both theoreti­
cal and empirical grounds, about the interdependence between equity cost 
and the payout r a t i o . T h e  negative payout coefficient in this study 
supports the view that investors have preference for dividends to capi­
tal gains.
In the preceding regression analysis, a strong, positive func­
tional relationship between the cost of equity and financial leverage 
was demonstrated. The sign of the leverage coefficient, however, is neu­
tral to the stance of the two conflicting theories on capital-structure 
effects, and merely reaffirms their point of accord that equity yield and 
financial leverage move in the same direction. The dispute can only be 
settled by comparing the magnitude of the observed leverage coefficients
4*Ibid., 622-623.
^^For opposing views on dividend policy and equity cost, refer 
to Modigliani and Miller, "Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of 
Shares," 411-434 and Eugene F. Brigham and Myron J. Gordon, "Leverage, 
Dividend Policy, and the Cost of Capital," Journal of Finance, XXIII 
(March, 1968), 85-105.
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with corresponding values predicted by M-M's proposition II and the tra­
ditional model. The former states that the cost of equity (K^ Is a func­
tion of the cost of equity for unlevered firms In the same Industry (K^), 
the rate of Interest (r), and the debt-to-equlty ratio (^), In a manner 
expressed below
Ka - + » „  - 4  (3-5)
The model In (3-5) predicts that In the absence of corporate taxes the 
leverage coefficient (b) Is equal to the difference between the required 
rate of return on a leverage-free capital structure and the rate of In­
terest:
K - r = b > 0 (3-6)
o
Provided that the rate of Interest does not rise with the progressive 
use of leverage, the advantage of debt financing Is counterbalanced by 
the rise of equity cost to render the over all cost of capital independ­
ent of leverage. The traditional view, on the other hand, maintains that 
with or without corporate taxes the leverage coefficient is lower than 
that predicted by the M-M model:
- r > b > 0 (3-7)
^"Hlodlgllanl and Miller, "The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance 
and the Theory of Investment," 271.
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Wlppem tested the two versions of capital structure effects on
equity yield In which the cost of equity for leverage-free firms was
estimated from the Intercept of the regression function and the rate of
52
Interest was approximated by Moody's Industrial Bond Yields. Given 
the predictions of Proposition II and the leverage dependence hypothesis 
set forth In equations (3-6) and (3-7), respectively, the empirical re­
sults showed strong evidence that the observed leverage coefficients for 
all the seven Industries during each of the periods were significantly 
lower than the forecast of the M-M model. Based on these findings, 
Wlppem concludes that, contrary to the M-M position, the cost of equity
does not respond to financial leverage to the extent of completely off-
53
setting the advantage of debt on eamings. However, the study does not 
directly establish the existence of optimal capital structure except by 
Implication. If the assumption In the empirical analysis concerning the 
constant rate of Interest were relaxed, a range of "diminishing retums" 
to excessive leverage could be demonstrated.
In addition to presenting Indirect empirical support In favor of 
optimal capital stmcture, Wlppem used an explicit measure of operating 
risk without having to rely the equivalent risk proposition. The latter 
approach should prove particularly useful In the analysis of conglomerate 
firms where a definition of the Industry Is not always operational. By 
directly Incorporating a measure of business risk In the leverage ratio.
52
For the sake of direct comparison between the traditional and 
M-M models of leverage effect, leverage coefficients based on Income state­
ment data were transformed to one based on the balance sheet. Wlppem, 
"Financial Structure and the Value of the Firm," 626.
^^Ibld.. 631.
102
the pattern of equity yield and financial leverage was demonstrated to 
be consistent with the traditional theory. Scott's empirical analysis, 
cited in the preceding section, had asserted that the industrial classi­
fication of firms is a better frame of reference for explaining capital 
structure differences rather than a parameter of operating risk. Even 
if indirectly, Wippem's multiple regression analysis in which the in­
fluence of the Industry factor was recognized by means of dummy variables 
does not support Scott's view about the relationship between operating 
risk and financial leverage. As pointed out in the preceding section, 
Scott's enqiirical results and their interpretation were logically incon­
sistent. Due to differences in the approach of the two studies, a direct 
comparison of their results would be perhaps inappropriate. But one 
thing may be said in favor of Wippem's investigation: the results and
their interpretation appear consistent.
Conclusion
Return on equity and its related risk reflect the compound effect 
of the investment and financing decisions on common stock. The earning 
power of assets and its accompanying risk, on the other hand, are inde­
pendent of financing decisions such as capital structure. The distinction 
between the two levels of risk and return defines the principal differ­
ence between portfolio analysis of conglomerate diversification with ref­
erence to the three studies by Melicher-Rush, Smith-Schreiner, and 
Westerfield; and portfolio analysis of conglomerate diversification in 
the context of this dissertation. With due allowance for their dissimi­
larities, the three papers essentially classify samples of common stocks
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by type (conglomerate firms, mutual funds, undiversified companies) and 
compare the risk and return performance of conglomerate securities with 
those of the other two groups. Since the three studies are primarily 
concerned with the measurement and evaluation of efficiency of diversi­
fication, in the sense of residual performance, they do not deem necessary 
considering the effects of operating risk and financial leverage separately.
The relevant return variable in the studies by Scott and Wlppem 
is operating return before financial charges. The two papers are partially 
related to the general approach of this dissertation in the sense that 
they develop a measure of variability in operating return and examine its 
effects on capital structure. The samples of companies analyzed by Scott 
and Wippem are treated as independent entities because the purposes of 
the studies were to test inter-variability differences in capital struc­
ture and to determine the effect of leverage on the cost of equity. With 
respect to business risk, the operating return of subsidiary companies 
are interdependent from the view point of the parent company. Subsidiary 
companies making up a conglomerate portfolio are analogous to securities 
composing a portfolio of risky assets. In a study addressed to the effect 
of conglomerate diversification on capital structure, interrelationships 
between the operating return of subsidiaries and their joint influence on 
the stability of the parent conq>any's operating income cannot be over­
looked. Since one of the merits of portfolio analysis is its explicit 
recognition of interrelationships between returns of portfolio components, 
the model for portfolio variance is a useful tool for monitoring the effect 
of diversified acquisition on the stability of operating return. An ex­
amination of this approach and the results of the attendant empirical
104
analysis are presented in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION 
Introduction
In Chapter Two, a theoretical framework for the leverage impli­
cation of the portfolio effect was developed. The theory of corporate 
finance concerning inverse relationships between the variability of op­
erating profit and financial leverage was discussed and the implications 
were extended to the effect of diversification on the capital structure 
of multi-industry firms. On the ground that an inverse relationship be­
tween the two variables is theoretically sound and empirically supported, 
for a cross section of industries, a case was made to explain the finan­
cial advantages of conglomerate diversification in terms of increased 
leverage capacity.
In the theoretical aspect of this paper, the broad principles of 
diversification were extensively covered, with particular reference to 
conglomerate mergers. The popular but naive approach to the measurement 
of corporate diversification, often based on a simple frequency count of 
industries in which a firm operated plants, was criticized. An alterna­
tive and a more sophisticated method of analyzing diversification was 
proposed in a form of the portfolio technique. Hence, the secondary pur­
pose of this chapter is to measure corporate diversification within a
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portfolio framework. The primary objective is to test empirically, by 
means of a case study, the proposition that some quantum of financial 
leverage can be generated by corporate diversification. The subject 
of the study is the LTV Corporation during the period 1962-1971.^
According to the Fortune Directory of 500 in 1962, the LTV Corp­
oration was ranked as the 158th largest Industrial corporation. Over a 
decade, by combined means of diversified acquisitions, internal growth, 
and frequent reorganizations, its position moved in 1971 to that of the 
20th largest industrial corporation and the second largest conglomerate 
firm.
The difficult task of applying multi-period portfolio analysis 
to such a complex organization cannot be fully appreciated without a 
historical perspective about the organizational changes and the acquisi­
tion activities of the subject company during the period covered in the 
2
study. Hence, a historical account of major developments between 1962 
and 1971 is briefly reviewed in the following section.
Organization and Acquisition History of LTV (1962-1971) 
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., a name adopted in 1961, is the company 
that survived a series of mergers and acquisitions which began in 1959.
Several considerations prompted the choice of the LTV Corpora­
tions as the subject of the enq>irlcal study. According to the 1971 
Fortune Directory of largest corporations, LTV was one of the 50 largest 
diversified industrial firms. The corporate head office located in Dallas, 
which is less than 200 miles from Norman made it easily accessible for 
needed consultation. In addition to the large size of the company and 
its proximity to the home base of this researcher, enthusiastic support 
and cooperation was received from the office of the Chief Financial 
Officer.
9
“Another important consideration was the "high visibility" of 
LTV subsidiaries which made them conducive to the method of portfolio 
analysis adopted in this study.
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The original company, Ling Electronics, Inc., was formed in California 
in 1953. Following the acquisition of Altec Companies, Inc., in 1959, 
the company came to be known as Ling Altec Electronics, Inc. After the 
acquisition of Temco Aircraft Corporation in 1960, the name. Ling Elec­
tronics, Inc. was changed to Ling-Temco Electronics, Inc. The present 
name, Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. (LTV), was adopted after the acquisition 
of Chance Vought Corporation in late 1961. Hence, 1962 marks the first
3
full year of the company's operation as LTV.
In 1962, LTV consisted of twenty-four divisions and subsidiaries. 
During the next three years, the company implemented its decision to pur­
sue continued growth within the aerospace and the electronics industries 
and seek operating economies by combining related operating units. Cer­
tain subsidiaries and product lines that were not complementary to LTV's 
primary fields of activity were relinquished. The elimination of such 
units was accompanied by steps to streamline and strengthen the company's 
organization. These steps included changing subsidiary companies to di­
visional status, assigning new names to most divisions to identify them 
more clearly as LTV operating units, and consolidating similar units 
more closely together under fewer divisions. By 1964, through a combi­
nation of dispositions, acquisitions, and reorganizations, LTV had col­
lected its corporate effort into eleven operating units.
In late 1964 and early 1965, the eleven operating divisions of 
LTV were restructured under a reorganization plan entitled "Project
3
This fact was the primary consideration in choosing 1962 as the 
initial period for analyzing LTV's diversification and financing program 
during 1962-1971.
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Redeployment." Under the redeployment plan, LTV was reorganized into 
four independent units: a parent operating company and three wholly-
owned subsidiaries with specialized product lines and technical capabi­
lities. Eight of the eleven operating divisions were transferred to 
the three subsidiaries. LTV Aerospace Corporation, LTV Electrosystems, 
Inc., and LTV Ling Altec, Inc. were formed to concentrate on aerospace, 
electronics, and sound systems, respectively. The three remaining div­
isions were retained by the parent company with plans towards eventual 
redeployment.
Assets of the eight divisions were transferred to the three sub­
sidiaries at book value. In exchange for assets received, the subsidi­
aries assumed the liabilities of the parent company valued at $31.7 
million. In addition, the parent company received from each of the three 
subsidiaries 1,200,000 shares of common stock and 65,000 shares of 4% 
convertible preferred stock. Subsequently, LTV stockholders were offered 
the option of exchanging their holdings in the parent company for the 
common stock of subsidiary companies. For each LTV common share tendered, 
one-half of each subsidiary's common share and nine dollars in cash were 
paid. Owners of LTV common were allowed to exchange their holdings up 
to one-third of the outstanding common shares of each of the three sub­
sidiaries. The public offering to LTV common stockholders was instrumen­
tal to the establishment of definite market values for LTV's investments 
in the three subsidiaries as one of the objectives of Project Redeploy­
ment. By the end of 1965, the creation of minority interests had reduced 
LTV ownership in each subsidiary to ninety percent.
Under Project Redeployment, several factors led to the formation
109
of three subsidiaries and a parent operating company. Managerlally, 
the centralization of control was matched by the decentralization of 
authority as an effective means of motivating each subsidiary’s per­
sonnel. Economically, the competitive position of the subsidiaries 
In their respective Industries was enhanced through greater speciali­
zation by freeing subsidiaries to do what they knew best. Functions 
which the specialized units could not provide for themselves economi­
cally without costly duplication were provided by the parent company. 
These functions Included financial planning, legal matters, public and 
Industrial relations, long-range product planning, basic research and 
computer services, expertise In the area of merger and acquisitions, and 
general management guidance. Project Redeployment, as a unique manage­
ment philosophy of operating through largely autonomous subsidiaries, 
was partly intended to prevent an adverse development In one unit from 
affecting other units. Should a subsidiary experience trouble. Its 
Impact would not be felt by other subsidiaries, and only minimally by 
the parent company. In a sense, therefore, the concept of Project Re­
deployment can be regarded as one form of diversification that could be 
achieved by effectively separating different operating units. Forming 
autonomous operating units was partly a result of LTV's previous experi­
ence In the sudden cancellation of defense contracts.
Project Redeployment attempts to combine the advantages of de­
centralization with the plus factors of centralization. As a result. It 
has been aptly termed as a concept of "optimum decentralization." In 
addition to achieving a large measure of autonomy and management motiva­
tion, LTV subsidiaries were enabled to establish definite market value
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as separate entities. As a management philosophy with broader scope, 
Project Redeployment was designed to encompass LTV's subsequent acqui­
sitions. The creation of minority interests and the disclosure of its 
operating units to public scrutiny by publishing subsidiary financial 
statements, both consequences of Project Redeployment, have earned for 
LTV a recognition as being, perhaps, the most visible corporation among 
the 500 largest industrials according to the June 15, 1968, issue of 
Fortune.
Project Redeployment was partly designed as a limited measure of 
protection against operating risk arising in one segment of LTV from af­
fecting other subsidiaries. In implementing Project Redeployment, LTV 
management was well aware that the formation of independent subsidiaries 
was no substitute for diversifying into non-defense sectors. In spite 
of the company's major reorganization during the redeployment program,
LTV remained largely a defense-oriented corporation. Between the incorp­
oration of LTV in 1961 and the first-phase completion of Project Redeploy­
ment, government sales made up nearly 90 percent of total LTV revenue, 
as shown in Figure 4-1. During the same period about 75 percent of total 
sales came from defense contracts.
A number of factors, all related to the company's heavy reliance 
on the defense business, prompted LTV's pressing need for diversifying 
into commercial sectors. By the end of 1964, LTV had not fully recovered 
from the cancellation of defense contracts in 1958 and 1960.^ In 1964,
4
According to company records, the 1958 contract cancellation 
resulted in the termination of 5900 employees. Over the next two years, 
sales dropped by 35 percent. The cancellation of the Corvus Missile 
program involved total expenditure estimated at $400 million.
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FIGURE 4-1. Relative Trend of LTV Sales by Principal Market
Sectors; 1962-1971
the Johnson Administration warned of an impending cutback in the defense 
budget. Through numerous officials of his administration, public state­
ments were made urging defense-oriented companies to diversify their pro­
ducts and markets. The management of LTV recognized the fact that the 
Company's prospects for growth were constrained by appropriations for de­
fense and the space program.
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In the face of economic uncertainties resulting from great re­
liance on the defense industry, the decision to seek diversification was 
rather compelling by mid 1960's. After recalling the experience of LTV 
up to 1963, Mr. James J. Ling, then Chairman of the Board and Chief 
Executive Officer, summed up the company's pattern of growth, beginning 
with the redeployment program:
I made a vow that never again would any company for which 
I was responsible be dependent upon one market, any one pro­
duct, or any one technology. Our concept would be that we 
would continually and on a sustained basis seek diversifica­
tion.5
Two methods of diversification were open to LTV: internal diver­
sification through research and development and external diversification 
by means of acquisitions. Research and development has always been a 
first-priority activity at LTV. This is evidenced by the fact that most 
of the products marketed by the company were internally developed. In 
addition to three divisions of the LTV Research Center located in Dallas, 
Anaheim, and Hawaii, each operating unit of LTV maintains its own sepa­
rate research function. Research and development at the parent company 
level was enlarged and strengthened as part of the redeployment program. 
Between 1962 and 1968, LTV made expenditures in research and development 
at annual rate of $15 million.^ Prior to 1965, most of these expenditures 
were directly tied to defense-related research. The company was well 
aware that redirecting its R&D effort as a means of achieving a pressing
^Remarks to the National Electrical Contractors' Association, 
October 17, 1968.
^The figure for research and development was obtained from LTV 
annual reports 1962-1968. Research and development expenditures for years 
1969-1971 were not included in the annual reports.
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need for diversification would be a slow process. The long lead time 
required to diversify by internal means, coupled with the risk inherent 
in internal diversification, prompted LTV to pursue acquisitions as a 
primary method of achieving immediate diversification.
LTV made acquisitions both directly through the parent company 
and indirectly through its subsidiaries. In October of 1565, LTV ac­
quired the Okonite Company from Kennecott Copper Corporation for a total 
consideration of $31 million, after the latter was forced by the courts 
to divest itself of a wholly-owned subsidiary. The Okonite specialized 
in the production and marketing of insulated electrical power and com­
munication cable. Two years later, the Okonite diversified into carpet­
ing and other floor covering businesses through the acquisition of General 
Felt Industries for a sum of $53.6 million.
LTV made its first major move towards diversification into the 
consumer and commercial markets with the acquisition of a 53 percent in­
terest in Wilson and Co. for a total sum of $81.5 million.^ At the time 
of its acquisition in January 1967, Wilson was the nation’s largest in 
meat packing and food processing and the world’s largest in the manufac­
ture of sporting goods and athletic equipment. Wilson was also involved 
in the chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Following its merger into 
LTV in June 1967, Wilson became the beneficiary of the redeployment con­
cept. Wilson was redeployed along the lines of meat and foods, sporting 
goods, and chemical and pharmaceutical products which resulted in the 
formation of three separate companies. At the end of 1967, LTV’s equity
The Wilson acquisition including subsequent additional purchase 
of 18 percent of the outstanding common stock involved a sum of $225.4 
million paid in cash and securities to Wilson stockholders.
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Interest in Wilson and Co., Inc., Wilson Sporting Goods Co., and Wilson 
Pharmaceutical and Chemical Corporation was 82 percent, 75 percent, and 
78 percent, respectively. The acquisitions of Wilson and that of the 
Okonite, the latter two years earlier, were responsible for drastically 
changing the composition of LTV sales. Commercial sales as a percent of 
total sales increased from 27 percent in 1966 to 72 percent in 1967 re­
presenting the most substantial change in the composition of LTV revenues 
in one year.
In September 1969, the number of Wilson companies increased from 
three to seven. The redeployment of Wilson & Co., Inc., resulted in the 
formation of four independent subsidiaries with each company concentrating 
on different lines of the meat and food industry. Wilson & Co., Inc., 
with an 89 percent LTV interest, became a parent holding company with con­
trolling ownership in excess of 80 percent in each of the four new subsi­
diaries: Wilson Beef & Lamb, Wilson Certified, Wilson Laurel Farms, and
Wilson Sinclair. In 1970, LTV’s 75 percent equity interest in Wilson 
Sporting Goods Co. and Wilson Pharmaceutical & Chemical Corporation was 
sold to Pepsi Co. and American Can, respectively, for an aggregate sum of 
$79 million.
With the acquisition of the original Wilson, LTV diversified into 
three unrelated industries simultaneously. Withdrawal from the chemical- 
pharmaceutical and sporting goods industries \?as accomplished with the dis­
position of these two Wilson subsidiaries. Wilson's food lines were streng­
thened by using the redeployment strategy. The net result cf the Wilson 
acquisition, subsequent redeployment, and partial disposition culminated 
in establishing LTV as a leading company in the food Industry.
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In 1968, with the acquisition of Braniff Airways, LTV extended 
its diversification activities into air transportation. Braniff joined 
the rank of LTV subsidiaries as part of the acquisition of Greatamerica 
Corporation, a holding company with diversified interests in banking,
g
insurance, and air and ground transportation. During the liquidation 
of Greatamerica which immediately followed its acquisition, LTV owner­
ship in the four subsidiaries engaged in banking and insurance was elim­
inated. Shortly after. National Car Rental System was sold, resulting 
in the retention of only Braniff out of the Greatamerica acquisition.
With the acquisition of a 63 percent ownership in Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corporation, through a tender offer at $85 per share, LTV extended 
its aggressive diversification program into the steel industry. At the 
time of the acquisition in June 1968, Jones & Laughlin Steel was the 
sixth largest manufacturer, of steel and steel products with sales in ex-
9
cess of $1.15 billion and assets of more than $1.13 billion. At the be­
ginning of 1969, Jones & Laughlin Industries was formed as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary for dual purposes of making an exchange offer for additional 
shares of Jones & Laughlin Steel and pursuing further diversification.
By the end of 1969, through an exchange offer of Jones & Laughlin Industries 
shares for those of Jones & Laughlin Steel, LTV's Indirect controlling in­
terest in the latter company increased to 81 percent. In the sense that
g
Greatamerica was acquired for a total consideration of $440.7 
million paid in subbordinated debentures and warrants. The six subsidi­
aries of Greatamerica were Braniff Airways, National Car Rental System, 
First Western Bank and Trust, Stonewall Insurance, American-Amicable Life 
Insurance, and Gulf Life Insurance.
9
Including subsequent increase of LTV ownership to 81 percent of 
outstanding common stock, Jones & Laughlin Steel was acquired for a tof=i 
value of $534.6 million.
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the purchase of Jones & Laughlln Steel was directly responsible for the 
subsequent divestiture of two subsidiaries, the acquisition of the steel 
company produced mixed effects on LTV's overall diversification program.
In April, 1969, the Department of Justice filed an antitrust 
suit against LTV challenging the acquisition of Jones & Laughlln Steel 
as a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act. The suit alleged that 
the transaction would be anticompetitive on grounds of substantial con­
centration of assets and the potential for reciprocal buying. In March 
1970, the suit was settled with the provisions that LTV complete the di­
vestiture of Branlff and Okonlte or Jones & Laughlln Steel within three 
years, that LTV and Its subsidiaries refrain from acquiring companies 
with assets exceeding $100 million without the prior knowledge of the 
Justice Department, and that LTV and/or Its subsidiaries not engage In 
reciprocal trading.
Pursuant to the court ruling, LTV opted to retain Jones & 
Laughlln Steel. In a series of transactions Initiated and consummated 
In 1971, the divestiture of the Okonlte and Branlff was completed.
Thus, the entry of LTV Into air transportation, electrical cable, car­
pets, and other floor covering products, terminated with the disposition 
of the two subsidiaries.
The terms of the settlement are binding for ten years. However, 
should LTV sell Jones & Laughlln Steel, the restrictions automatically 
terminate.
^^The Okonlte was sold to Omega-Alpha, a Dallas company formed by 
James J. Ling, who was the Board Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer 
of LTV at the time the Okonlte was acquired In 1965. Mr. Ling was not 
associated with LTV as of 1970.
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The preceding account of LTV's diversification program presented 
highlights of the parent conqpany's acquisitions and dispositions during 
1962-1971. As pointed out earlier, one of the objectives of the rede­
ployment concept was to enable LTV to make acquisltj-ons through its sub­
sidiaries. Accordingly, LTV pursued external diversification on two 
fronts: directly through the parent conq>any and indirectly through its
subsidiaries. To mention a few highlights of major acquisitions by LTV 
subsidiaries, LTV Electrosystems purchased Memcor, Inc. for a total sum 
of $7.8 million in January, 1967. LTV Ling Altec acquired Allied Radio 
Corporation and Escon. Inc. for an aggregate sum of $50.9 million in 
October, 1967 and March 1968, respectively. General Felt Industries was 
acquired by the Okonlte in January, 1969. LTV Aerospace, through its 
subsidiary LTV Educational System, has acquired beginning in 1969 more 
than 40 business and technical schools throughout the Southern half of
the United States. The examples cited here are only a few instances of
12
LTV acquisitions through its subsidiaries.
Prior to Project Redeployment, LTV had evolved into a monolithic
multi-divisional enterprise specializing in aerospace and electronics, 
having nearly 85 percent of its sales committed to the military and space
agencies. Realizing the risk of depending on a single market, LTV took
determined steps in the direction of a broad diversification program.
The result of its diversification effort, largely external, is reflected 
in changes in the composition of company sales. During the period 1962- 
1965, sales to the private and consumer sectors made up nearly 15 percent
12
For a detailed account of subsidiary acquisitions and disposi­
tions during the period 1962-1971 refer to Moody's Industrial Manual.
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of aggregate revenue. In the next five years sales to diverse commercial 
markets soared to about 80 percent of total company sales. In the fol­
lowing sections, the diversification pattern of LTV during ten years (1962- 
1971) is measured by employing the portfolio approach. The stability of 
operating profit resulting from diversification is then compared with the 
trend of capital structure on a yearly basis.
General Approach
The diversification activities of LTV after the first half of the 
1960's resulted in a substantial shift of emphasis from government contracts 
to commercial markets, the effect of which is depicted in the trend of the 
company's revenue structure in Figure (4-1). But a view of diversification 
based on the trend of relative sales in two highly aggregated sectors is 
probably more simplistic than the popular measure of corporate diversifi­
cation criticized earlier. The unique feature of the approach taken in
this study is the use of portfolio analysis, in the ex post sense, for ex-
13
amining conglomerate diversification. Individual subsidiaries were
treated as if they were securities. Similarly, the parent company (LTV)
14
was considered as a standard portfolio.
13
To the best knowledge of this researcher, no approach similar to 
the one used in this study is in evidence with regard to empirical investi­
gations of other scholars on the subject of conglomerate diversification.
14
Standard portfolio in this context means the elements of the port­
folio are securities, in contrat with a portfolio of subsidiaries, or a 
conglomerate portfolio. Sharpe draws a distinction between a basic portfo­
lio and a standard portfolio in terms of the number of constraints imposed 
on the objective function. The only constraints governing a basic portfolio 
problem age nonnegatively (X^ > 0 ) and the aggregate sum of weights adding 
to one = 1). In addition to these, a standard portfolio problem in­
cludes upper Dounds, lower bounds, and other requirements. See Sharpe, 
Portfolio Theory and Capital Markets. 59-66.
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The preliminary step in portfolio analysis consists of examining 
the characteristics of individual securities with respect to expected re­
turns, variance of returns and covariances among returns. In the same 
manner, the attributes of individual subsidiaries were measured in terms 
of the three parameters. Because of the presumed relationship between 
operating risk and leverage capacity, the relevant return variable was 
returned on subsidiary assets before interest and taxes, in contrast with 
security yield which is used as a return variable in standard portfolio 
analysis.
In the next phase of the investigation, the various subsidiaries 
were jointly brought together into a portfolio framework. Periodic changes 
in the composition and structure of subsidiaries constituting the conglo­
merate portfolio required the use of ex-post dynamic portfolio analysis: 
ex-post portfolio revision. Since an aspect of this study is concerned 
with examining the effect of corporate diversification on the stability 
of operating return, portfolio variance was measured at the end of each 
year over ten years. The pattern of variability in operating return was 
then conqiared with the trend of financial leverage to test the claimed 
validity of opposite direction of change between the two variables. Be- 
for specifying procedures followed in the three distinct phases (analysis 
of subsidiaries, ex-post portfolio analysis, and leverage analysis) of 
the empirical work, the choice of financial variables and the adjustment 
of their time series is described in the next section.
Selection of Variables and Adjustment of Time Series
The choice of financial variables in any empirical investigation
120
depends on the objective of the study. The purpose of this study is to 
examine the hypothesized opposite direction of change between the vari­
ability of operating profit and financial leverage over time due to con­
glomerate diversification. Five financial variables were selected: the
stream of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT), total assets, total 
equity, percent of controlling interest in subsidiaries, and financial 
leverage. Data for the first four variables were taken from the consoli­
dated operating and position statements of individual subsidiaries at the 
end of each year for ten years.Information for leverage ratios was 
obtained from the consolidated balance sheets and income statements of 
the parent cosq>any over the same period.
Earnings before Interest and taxes were chosen because they are 
considered to be the major determinant of a firm's leverage capacity. The 
theoretical justification for the dependence of financial leverage on the 
stability of operating profit was discussed in Chapter II. To eliminate 
scale effects on the variability of operating profit over time, EBIT was 
converted to a relative measure by expressing it as a percent of total 
assets. The book value of total equity and the corresponding fraction of 
the parent company's interest were used to determine the relative weight 
of each subsidiary in the parent company portfolio.
The processing of information (subsidiary analysis, portfolio an­
alysis, and leverage analysis) was preceded by the adjustment of some time 
series. Ideally, all units of the parent company and its subsidiaries
Data for this study were mostly conq>iled from Moody's Industrial 
Manual, and Moody's Transportation Manual in the case of Braniff. When 
unavailable in Moody's, the required information was obtained from the 
annual reports of individual subsidiaries and priviledged company fj
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should be directly included in the portfolio analysis. This treatment 
would have required separate computation of the critical portfolio in­
puts for units purchased or sold by LTV and its subsidiaries during the 
period covered in this study. Unfortunately, such a direct and compre­
hensive approach could not be adopted because continuous and parallel 
time series covering the full ten years were impossible to obtain. The 
difficulty arose from the high level of aggregation in financial report­
ing practiced both before and subsequent to acquisitions by selling and 
buying parties. For example, if an acquisition were made in 1966 for 
which there were no prior financial statements, observing the co-movement 
of the acquired company's operating profit in relation to existing subsi­
diaries and prospective acquisitions was not possible. The same problem 
was faced with regard to dispositions made by LTV subsidiaries in which 
the records of units relinquished were subsequently consolidated into 
those of the new parent. However, if not separately treated, all units 
of LTV and its subsidiaries were indirectly included in the portfolio 
analysis because the time series were compiled from the consolidated 
financial statements of individual subsidiaries. The preparation of con­
solidated statements at the subsidiary level would support the position 
taken in this study, that is, each of these companies is a portfolio con­
sisting of second level subsidiaries. For example, Wilson & Co. is a 
parent holding company of four Wilson subsidiaries. LTV in turn acts as 
parent to Wilson & Co. In a sense, therefore, LTV is a portfolio of port­
folios in this study.
In consideration of the above problems, LTV was treated as a port­
folio consisting of the operating divisions of the parent, as one unit.
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and seven autonomous subsidiaries: LTV Aerospace Corporation, LTV Electro­
systems, Inc., LTV Ling Altec, Inc., The Okonlte Company, Wilson & Co.,
Inc., Branlff International, and Jones & Laughlln Steel Corporation. After 
reducing LTV to eight manageable subsets on the basis of availability of 
data, each unit was separately examined to determine whether adjustment 
of time scries was necessary. In certain cases, adjustment of financial 
variables was unavoidable due to the frequent redeployments after 1965.
As discussed under the historical background of the LTV Corporation, 
LTV Aerospace, LTV Electrosystems, and LTV Ling Altec were organized in 
1964 as a result of Project Redeployment. Since these subsidiaries did not 
exist as separate entitles before the reorganization, their Individual fi­
nancial statements were publicly unavailable for 1962 and 1963. On the 
basis of divisions transferred to the three subsidiary companies pursuant 
to Project Redeployment, estimates of the required financial variables 
were extracted from company files. Until 1968, the LTV Corporation did not 
follow the practice of separate financial disclosure with regard to the 
operating divisions of the parent company. For the period 1962-1967, un­
consolidated financial statements pertaining to the operating divisions of 
the parent company were compiled from priviledged company documents.
Before the Okonlte was acquired In 1966, the company had been a 
subsidiary of Kennecott Copper with its financial history during the pre­
ceding four years submerged In the consolidated statements of the parent 
company. For the period 1962-65, estimates of operating profit were ob­
tained from LTV files. But these estimates were not accompanied by related 
balance sheet figures. To complete the partial reporting of assets for 
ten years, the average annual growth rate of assets during six years (1966- 
1971) was assumed to hold for the preceding four years. On that premise.
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the value of assets at the end of each year between 1962 and 1965 was de­
termined by discounting the balance of assets at the end of 1966 at the 
estimated annual growth rate. The same approach was used in generating 
equity figures. However, the extent of realism in obtaining equity fig­
ures was of minimal consequence because the participation level of the 
Okonite in the LTV portfolio of subsidiaries before the acquisition was 
zero.
As reported earlier, the acquisition of Wilson was followed by 
the organization of three Wilson subsidiaries in 1967. In 1969, four ad­
ditional Wilson subsidiaries were incorporated. These developments were 
recognized in compiling time series for one representative company of 
Wilson subsidiaires. For the period 1967-1971, EBIT, equity, and assets 
of Wilson & Co., Wilson Sporting Goods, and Wilson Chemical and Pharma­
ceutical Corporation were aggregated to make these figures comparable to 
those of the preceding five years.
The organization of Jones & Laughlin Industries as a parent hold­
ing company of Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation did not require adjust­
ment of financial data because the former did not control separate operat­
ing divisions. Braniff International was not redeployed after acquisi­
tion. The data for this subsidiary was directly taken from Moody's Trans­
portation Manual without requiring any change. Having compiled adjusted 
yearly time series covering ten years and encompassing four financial vari­
ables and eight subsidiaries, the stage was set for performing subsidiary
Since Wilson & Co. was a parent holding company of the remain­
ing Wilson subsidiaries, the financial records of these units were included 
in the consolidated statements of the parent Wilson.
analysis.
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Analysis of Subsidiaries
The portfolio technique of the original Markowitz type requires 
security analysis to be performed as a preliminary step towards ex-ante 
portfolio analysis. As discussed In Chapter II, the task of security 
analysis consists of making predictions about expected returns and vari­
ances of returns for Individual securities, In addition to determining 
covariances among security returns. The three parameters make up the 
statistical Information necessary for portfolio analysis. Correspondingly, 
an ex-post portfolio analysis of LTV was preceded by the analysis of Its 
Individual subsidiaries to determine their respective attributes In terms 
of average operating returns, variance of operating returns, and covari­
ances among operating returns. In ex-post portfolio analysis, a method 
of evaluating diversification performance, risk and return achieved by 
the portfolio provide sufficient Information for rating performance be­
cause covariances among the elements are implicitly reflected. The rea­
sons for explicitly considering interrelationships in retrospective port­
folio analysis are explained later In conjunction with the computation of 
covariances.
The first step In preparation for subsidiary analysis was to de­
termine the yearly rate of operating return on assets:
“^These time series are reported in Appendices A-D.
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where
i — 1 » 2 f .« », 8
t = 1 , 2 , 10
As shown in Equation (4-1), this step was accomplished by expressing EBIT 
(E. ) during a year as a percent of the average of beginning and ending
asset balances (A^ t-l^^i during the same period. The averaging of
the two asset balances was required by possibilities of contributions and 
withdrawals of assets during the interim period. The annual rate of op­
erating return (r. ) was conqiuted for individual subsidiaries over ten
years.
The next step consisted of calculating the average yearly rate 
of operating return on assets.
T-IG
1  T r 
T " i . t
The average yearly rate of operating return (r^) was computed by taking 
the arithmetic mean of ten annual observations. Eight arithmetic means 
were generated for the eight units which made up the LTV portfolio of sub­
sidiaries. Each subsidiary's annual rate of operating return and the 
mean rate of operating return over ten years are shown in Table 4-1.
The risk surrogate used in this study was the intertemporal vari­
ability of operating return. Accordingly, the variance of each subsidi­
ary's operating return was computed in a manner shown in Equation
(4-3).
18
In this paper, the variance was preferred to the standard devi­
ation as a risk surrogate of a subsidiary's operating return because the 
portfolio phase of the analysis could be simplified by regarding the
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TABLE 4-1
ANNUAL AND MEAN RATE OF OPERATING RETURN® 
BY S U B S I D I A R Y 1962-1971
LTA LTE LTP LTL LTO LTW LTB LTJ
1962 0.14926 0.19768 0.15698 0.10520 0.03304 0.11282 0.05869 0.05610
1963 0.13250 0.20104 0.01928 0.23326 -0.00119 0.11029 0.04303 0.10359
1964 0.19362 0.22154 0.11936 0.12637 0.06704 0.17007 0.12443 0.11607
1965 0.14715 0.16169 -0.00682 0.09630 0.13860 0.10762 0.13178 0.09694
1966 0.14516 0.12232 0.00397 0.10704 0.31697 0.14829 0.12053 0.11449
1967 0.13673 0.14398 0.05614 0.11880 0.18757 0.13389 0.04960 0.03599
1968 0.13212 0.09604 0.00310 0.10189 0.10957 0.14970 0.07157 0.04100
1969 0.10950 -0.01891 0.01202 0.04173 0.00251 0.12194 0.05649 0.03261
1970 0.08118 0.09733 0.01680 0.02816 0.05573 0.14483 0.04467 0.00392
1971 0.03944 0.07676 0.02354 0.07584 0.00000 0.13253 0.06781 0.03336
MEAN 0.12667 0.12995 0.04044 0.10346 0.09099 0.13320 0.07686 0.06341
®The figures in the table were computed from Appendices A and B.
^The column initials stand for LTA = LTV Aerospace Corporation; LTE = LTV 
Electrosystems, Inc.; LTP = Operating divisions of parent company; LTL = LTV 
Ling Altec, Inc.; LTO = The Okonlte Company; LTW = Wilson & Co., Inc.; LTB = 
Braniff International; LTJ = Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.
variance of a subsidiary's return as the covariance between the same subsi­
diary's return— which in fact is true:
-  ,2-2 1 1 / 
°i ■ T til (fi.t-'i)
If i=j, then, 0^ " 3^ .
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h  “ T J ,  <"l,t - (4-3)
t=l
As a last step of subsidiary analysis, covariances among the 
operating returns of the eight con^anles were computed to determine the 
co-movement of each paired combinations of subsidiaries composing the 
LTV portfolio. Before specifying the computation of covariances, the 
explicit role of Interrelationships In ex post portfolio analysis, and 
in this study In particular, must be noted. Ordinarily, an evaluation of 
portfolio performance Is based on risk and return achieved by the port­
folio In question. Interrelationships or covariances among the elements 
of the portfolio are Implicitly reflected In the two parameters of the 
portfolio over time. The Implicitness of covariances among the elements 
of a portfolio are evident In the three widely known approaches for mea­
suring ex-post portfolio performance: Shapre's Variability, Treynor's
Volatility, and Jenesen's Predictability, all of which rank Investment
19
portfolios on the basis of risk and return. The explicit consideration 
of covariances Is pertinent In ex ante portfolio analysis where Inter­
relationships among the elements of the portfolio are crucial to the se­
lection and subsequent performance of the portfolio.
Portfolio analysis In the context of this study Is retrospective. 
An explicit consideration of covariances among the operating returns of 
LTV subsidiaries would not have been necessary if the aim of this study
19For a comparative study of the three approaches, refer to Smith 
and Trito, "Rlsk-Retum Measures of Ex Post Portfolio Performance," 
449-471.
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were not to simultaneously compare the pattern of stability in LTV's 
operating return and its effect on financial leverage on a yearly basis. 
The dynamic nature of the study, although ex post, both in terms of port­
folio analysis and leverage analysis, prompted the direct inclusion of 
subsidiary covariances. Therefore, covariances among the eight sub­
sidiaries which comprised LTV portfolio were computed, as shown in the 
following equation;
T=10
<'i.t - (4-4)
The variance-covarlance matrix of the eight LTV subsidiaries is shown 
in Table 4-2. After performing subsidiary analysis, as indicated in 
Equations (2-1) through (2-4) and Tables 1 and 2, in which the attributes 
of subsidiaries were measured In terms of average returns, variances of 
returns, and covariances among returns, the next major step consisted of 
a portfolio analysis of these subsidiaries.
Ex Post Portfolio Analysis 
The purpose of portfolio analysis in an ex ante sense is to iden­
tify the efficient sets from which an optimal portfolio is selected. In 
the process, optimal proportions of investment in each decision variable 
are obtained as a solution. Portfolio analysis in the context of this 
study is not intended to identify an optimal portfolio of subsidiaries, 
nor show optimal proportions according to which the LTV Corporation should 
have invested in its subsidiaries. Since this investigation is concerned 
with portfolio analysis in an ex post sense, the relative magnitudes of
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TABLE 4-2
VARIANCE-COVARIANCE MATRIX OF SUBSIDIARY 
OPERATING r e tu rns/  1962-1971
LTA LTE LTP LTL LTO LTW LTB LTJ
LTA 0.00159 0.00172 0.00091 0.00093 0.00138 0.00015 0.00068 0.00107
LTE 0.00172 0.00465 0.00198 0.00246 0.00070 0.00002 0.00065 0.00164
LTP 0.00091 0.00198 0.00271 0.00038 -0.00115 0 . 00011 -0.00006 0.00022
LTL 0.00093 0.00246 0.00038 0.00279 -0.00001 -0.00021 -0.00000 --0.00132
LTO 0.00138 0.00070 -0.00115 -0.00001 0.00928 0.00056 0.00165 0.00131
LTW 0.00015 0.00002 0 . 0 0 0 1 1 -0.00021 0.00056 0.00037 0.00019 0.00004
LTB 0.00068 0.00065 -0.00006 -0.00000 0.00165 0.00019 0.00110 0.00090
LTJ 0.00107 0.00164 0. 0 0022 0.00132 0.00131 0.00004 0.00090 0.00148
*The figures in the table were computed on the basis of Appendices A and B.
each subsidiary in the parent company portfolio were given.
The preliminary task in this section consisted of transforming the 
investments of the parent in each of its subsidiaries to a form suitable, 
as weighting factors, for portfolio analysis. This task was accomplished 
in three distinct steps. First, the annual book value of LTV equity in 
each subsidiary (c, ) was computed by multiplying yearly total equity ofIj t
each subsidiary (S, ) and the corresponding fraction of controlling in-
1 ^
terest (w, ) held by the parent company:
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The following table presents the book value of equity held by LTV in 
individual subsidiaries at the end of each of the ten years. The zero 
values between 1962 and 1967 corresponding to the Okonite, Wilson, 
Braniff, and Jones & Laughlin show that these subsidiaries had not been 
acquired and, therefore, were not part of the conglomerate portfolio. 
Similarly, the zero values in 1971 relating to the Okonite and Braniff 
show the divestiture of the two subsidiaries which resulted from the 
antitrust ruling cited earlier. Second, the book values of LTV equity 
in each subsidiary were then aggregated to provide a basis for conver­
sion to percentages:
n* 8
- j, =i.t
As a final step, the equities of the parent in each subsidiary were con­
verted to relative values (X. ) by expressing them as percentages of the
1 1 c
aggregate parent company equities in all the subsidiaries:
Obviously, the sum of these fractions adds to unity:
N=8
(4-7)
The last column of Table 4.4 satisfies this constraint. Due to the multi­
period approach of portfolio analysis in this study, to be specified 
shortly, a total of 80 participation levels were computed as shown in
t a b l e 4-3
LTV EQUITY® IN EACH SUBSIDIARY, 1962-1971 
(In Thousands of Dollars)
LTA LTE LTP LTL LTO LTW LTB LTJ TOTAL
1962 66089.0 7955.0 21381.0 6659.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 102084.0
1963 31513.0 5873.0 27616.0 6083.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 71085.0
1964 6047.0 1984.0 25468.0 3301.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 36800.0
1965 8687.7 3746.7 30534.0 3465.0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 46433.4
1966 19309.5 9168.6 58906.0 4131.6 20485.2 0 . 0 0 . 0 0 . 0 112000.9
1967 28574.5 18423.1 245409.0 13219.2 29766.2 82054.1 0 . 0 0 . 0 _ 417446.0
1968 45246.6 21378.0 288567.0 16800.2 34930.6 93690.8 55265.8 447509.8 1003388.0
1969 70514.6 17875.8 268174.0 17040.4 38654.4 112036.7 49043.7 567100.7 1140440.0
1970 76582.8 21356.9 181490.0 10496.7 47316.0 76358.4 46557.6 542506.3 1002664.0
1971 73726.0 2 2 2 0 2 . 1 207851.0 8726.7 0 . 0 66208.8 0 . 0 548988.8 927703.3
®The figures in the table were computed from Appendices C and D.
TABLE 4-4
PROPORTION^ OF LTV INVESTMENT IN EACH SUBSIDIARY, 1962-1971
LTA LTE LTP LTL LTO LTW LTB LTJ TOTAL
1962 0.64740 0.07793 0.20945 0.06523 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1963 0.44331 0.08262 0.38849 0.08557 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1964 0.16432 0.05391 0.69207 0.08970 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1965 0.18710 0.08069 0.65759 0.07462 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1966 0.17240 0.08186 0.52594 0.03689 0.18290 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1967 0.06845 0.04413 0.58788 0.03167 0.07131 0.19656 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1968 0.04509 0.02131 0.28759 0.01674 0.03481 0.09337 0.05508 0.44600 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1969 0.06183 0.01567 0.23515 0.01494 0.03389 0.09824 0.04300 0.49726 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1970 0.07638 0.02130 0.18101 0.01047 0.04719 0.07616 0.04643 0.54106 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
1971 0.07947 0.02393 0.22405 0.00941 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.07137 0 . 0 0 0 0 0 0.59177 1 . 0 0 0 0 0
^Computed on the basis of Appendices C and D.
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Table 4-4. These included 8 subsidiaries over ten years on yearly basis. 
The Okonite, Braniff, Wilson, and Jones & Laughlin Steel were acquired 
at different times after 1965. The first two were sold in 1970. Before 
acquisition and after disposition, these subsidiaries were assigned par­
ticipation levels of zero in the LTV portfolio. Before undertaking an 
intense diversification program in 1966, more than seventy five percent 
of LTV portfolio was invested in the operating divisions of the parent 
company and LTV Aerospace. After 1967, Wilson and Jones & Laughlin Steel 
made up nearly sixty percent of their parent company's portfolio.
After generating the four sets of parameters consisting of aver­
age operating returns, variances of operating returns, covariances among 
operating returns, and subsidiary participation levels, the variability 
of the parent company's operating return was measured on a yearly basis 
over ten years by using a model of portfolio revision in an ex post sense. 
Before specifying the computation of portfolio variance, important dif­
ferences between portfolio analysis and portfolio revision require some 
clarification. Portfolio analysis is a static optimization technique 
based on single-period expectations. But expectations are seldom stable. 
As history unfolds, predictions made earlier about decision variables 
such as securities become obsolete in the light of new developments, and 
the existing portfolio is rendered suboptimal. As part of an ongoing 
search for optimality, expectations require periodic review, and port­
folios frequent adjustment. Thus, portfolio revision is an inter-temporal
20
approach to portfolio selection.
20
The most outstanding distinction between portfolio selection
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In addition to change in economic expectations as the cause of 
portfolio revision, multi-period portfolio decision can also be described 
in terms of its effect on the composition and structure of portfolios.
As decision variables like securities and subsidiaries leave and enter 
the portfolio, in part or as a whole, the effect is reflected in changes 
in participation levels. For exasçle, the divestiture of the Okonlte 
and Braniff in 1971 reduced the participation level of the two companies 
to zero, in addition to altering the relative weight of the remaining 
subsidiaries in the parent company portfolio. Portfolio revision from 
the view point of its effect on the structure of the portfolio was espe­
cially useful in the context of this study in which revision was taken 
in the after-the-fact sense. In that respect, the ex post portfolio 
revision framework was eu^loyed as a sequential application of the one- 
period portfolio model. This allowed the model for portfolio standard 
deviation to be used for determining the variability of the parent com­
pany's operating return, as shown in the following equation:
n*8 n«8
il il (4-8)
where
d(R )■ conglomerate portfolio standard deviation at the end of 
P»*-
and portfolio revision lies in the static nature of the former and the 
dynamic nature of the latter. Because portfolio revision is multi-period 
compared to single-period portfolio selection, Smith considers portfolio 
selection as a subset of the more general portfolio revision model. For 
more detail, see K. V. Smith, Portfolio Management: Theoretical and
Empirical Studies of PortfolicTDecislon Making (New York: Holt. Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1971), 199-231.
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period t.
X. X. - participation levels of the 1^^ and subsidiaries 
at the end of period t.
= covariances between subsidiaries i and j.
Parameters for participation levels (X. ;X. ) and variance-covarlance
(ô^j) are based on Tables 4-4 and 4-2, respectively. The time subscript 
(t) in Equation (4-8) denotes the changing structure in the composition 
of subsidiaries over time and the corresponding effect on portfolio dis­
persion at the end of each period over ten years. The diversification
performance of the LTV Corporation was computed annually over ten years
21
in terms of the variability of operating returns. Table 4-5 shows the 
variability of the parent company's operating return and was generated by 
employing Equation (4-8). Changes in the variability of operating return, 
designated as portfolio effect, reflect the influence of diversification 
on the stability of operating return. The portfolio effect was obtained 
by finding differences between consecutive levels of the standard devia­
tion of operating returns. Noteworthy are the negative signs of the port­
folio effect between 1965 and 1968. The steady decline in the variability 
of operating return during four years coincides with the period of diver­
sified major acquisitions such as the Okonite, Wilson, Braniff, and Jones & 
Laughlin Steel. The moderate rise in the standard deviation of portfolio
21
In the context of this study, diversification performance refers 
to the operating risk dimension of joint LTV subsidiaries as measured by 
portfolio variance. In its usual sense, diversification performance means 
a trade-off between risk and return achieved by portfolios such as mutual 
funds. The common approaches for rating portfolio performance are accord­
ing to the dominance principle, comparison with some market index, and 
in relation to randomly selected portfolios. Ibid., 235-261.
TABLE 4-5
PORTFOLIO EFFECT OF CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION
Year 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
Variability of
Operating Return 0.03775 0.03837 0.04315 0.04305 0.03816 0.03456 0.02904 0.02911 0.03038 0.03102
J H*
Portfolio Effect 0.00062 0.00478 -0.00175 -0.00324 -0.00359 -0.00552 0.00007 0.00127 0.00064 ^
'differences between consecutive levels of portfolio standard deviation.
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operating returns may be attributed to the divestiture of Wilson Sporting 
Goods, Wilson Pharmaceutical & Chemical, the Okonlte, and Branlff. In­
creases In the variability of operating return during the first three years 
correspond to the period heavy reliance on the defense Industry and other 
government contracts which was the primary reason for seeking dlverslflca- 
ammerelal sector.
Leverage Implication of Portfolio Effect 
After cooq>letlng the sequences of subsidiary analysis and portfo­
lio analysis, which were essential steps for generating the Independent 
variable, effort was focused on the primary task of this paper: examin­
ing the effect of conglomerate diversification on capital structure. Thus, 
the final phase of the empirical analysis Involved assessing the leverage 
Implication of the portfolio effect. To determine whether the hypothesized 
Inverse relationship between portfolio standard deviation and some measure 
of financial leverage was empirically valid, regression analysis was per­
formed. Data used In the regression analysis are shown In Table 4-6.
In Table 4-6, alternative measures of financial leverage are pre­
sented. The use of these multiple standards merits some clarification.
As pointed out In earlier discussions, the concept of financial leverage 
stems from the use of fixed charge securities and common stock In the cap­
italization of a company. Whereas this broad classification of capital 
sources underlies the capital structure problem In general, there appears
to be no general consensus regarding a specific measure of financial 
22
leverage. Standards of financial leverage have been defined In terms
^^Ghandi, "Oa the rieasurement of Leverage," 715-721.
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TABLE 4-6
VALUES^ OF DEPENDENT AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
USED IN REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Year d(Rp) L^=TD/TE Lg-TD/TA Lg=LD/TA Lj,=I/EBr
1962 0.03775 3.00000 0.82034 0.39099 0.39189
1963 0.03837 1.30000 0.73314 0.24556 0.20530
1964 0.04315 9.60000 0.74488 0.29134 0.37398
1965 0.04305 5.00000 0.81670 0.19911 0.24675
1966 0.03816 3.70000 0.74430 0.32105 0.15278
1967 0.03456 1.50000 0.64620 0.23973 0.18870
1968 0.02904 10.00000 0.77872 0.46700 0.58813
1969 0.02911 7.00000 0.79316 0.50973 1.01702
1970 0.03038 11.40000 0.80702 0.54104 1.42667
1971 0.03102 6.90000 0.76666 0.50548 0.98972
^Calculation of leverage ratios is based on data in Appendix E. The no-
tâtions represent L^  ^= different leverage ratios, TA * total assets, TD = 
total debt, TE = total equity, LD ■ long-term debt, I = interest, EBIT = 
earning before interest and taxes, and d(Rp) » standard deviation of port­
folio operating return.
of the structure of the balance sheet and the income statement— stock vs.
flow measures. The exclusion of short-term debt from some leverage ratios
has resulted in a subtle distinction between capital structure and finan- 
23
cial structure. The former refers to the composition and relative mag-
23
J. Fred Weston and Eugene F. Brigham, Managerial Finance (New 
York: Holt Rinehart and Winston, 1972); 249.
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nitude of long-term capital. Further diversity has been added due to 
procedures of valuation— book value vs. market value.
In this study alternative measures of leverage were used to ob­
serve whether or not the various formulations would have differential 
effects upon the degree of association between operating risk and finan­
cial leverage. The four leverage ratios employed in the present analy­
sis consist of total debt-to-total equity, total debt-to-total assets, 
long-term debt-to-total assets, and interest-to-eamings before interest 
and taxes. The first two measures and the third refer to a distinction 
between financial structure and capital structure, respectively. The
last ratio is a flow measure of leverage and is similar to the leverage
24
standard used by Wippem.
The four leverage ratios were computed at the end of each year 
over the period 1962-1971 on the basis of information obtained from the 
consolidated balance sheets and income statements of the parent company. 
The scatter diagrams shown in Figures 4-2 - 4-5 were examined prior to 
specifying the form of functioned relationship between the variability 
of operating return and financial leverage. Inspection of the scatters 
indicated that a linear model would be appropriate for explaining an in­
terdependence of the bivariate sample. Simple regression analysis was 
performed by treating the standard deviation of portfolio operating return 
as the independent variable, and the different measures of financial le­
verage as the dependent variable:
Li = Si + b^d(Rp) (4-9)
^Sjippcm, "Financial Structure and the Value of the Firm." 616-619.
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Lg = TD/TA
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FIGURE 4-2. Inverse Relationship between Variability of Operating 
Return and Financial Leverage (Total Debt-To-Total 
Assets)
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FIGURE 4-3. Inverse Relationship between Variability of Operating 
Return and Financial Leverage (Total Debt-To-Total 
Equity)
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FIGURE 4-4. Inverse Relationship between Variability of Operating 
Return and Financial Leverage (Long-Term Debt-To-Total 
Assets)
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FIGURE 4-5. Inverse Relationship between Variability of Operating 
Return and Financial Leverage (Interest-To-Earnings 
before Interest and Taxes)
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where
- a measure of leverage ratio
a^ « an intercept of regression equation
- a regression coefficient
5(Rp) ■ standard deviation of portfolio operating return
1 - 1 . .4, denoting different leverage ratios
The four leverage ratios were Individually regressed on the
standard deviation of portfolio operating return. Since financial 
leverage was measured four different ways, a total of four regres­
sion equations were derived. The coefficients of these equations 
were estimated by the method of least squares, the results of which 
are reported In the following table.
TABLE 4-7 
RESULTS^ OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Leverage ratios
Parameters
L^-TD/TE L^-TD/TA Lj-LD/TA L^=I/EBIT
Leverage Intercept (a^ )^ 14.76 0.79 1.07 2.61
Regression Coefficient (b^ )^ -248.75 -0.62 -19.62 -57.77
Standard Error of 
Estimate (e^) 3.55 0.05 0.07 0.31
Correlation Coefficient (p^) -0.37 -0.07 -0.83 -0.72
Standard Error Regression 
Coefficient (9(b^)) 218.11 3.38 4.60 19.93
t value (-1.14)*^ (-0.18)® (-4.27)^ (-2.90)®
Q b
All figures are rounded to two decimal places; significant at the .005 
level; ‘^ significant at the .01 level; ‘^ significant at the .15 level; ®not 
significant.
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The statistical summary In the table consists of Intercepts of 
the Independent variable (a^), regression coefficients (b^), standard 
errors of estimates (e^), correlation coefficients (p^ )^, standard errors 
of regression coefficients (o(b^)), and t values. As noted by appropri­
ate column captions, the five sets of parameters correspond to different 
leverage ratios.
According to an aspect of the theory of capital structure, greater 
variability In operating returns Is associated with lower debt capacity. 
The leverage Implication of the portfolio effect for diversified firms Is 
a special case of the Inverse relationship between operating risk and 
financial leverage. Hence, the slopes of the regression equations des­
cribing an Interdependence between the two variables were predicted to 
negative. As reported in Table 4-7, the signs of these regression coeffi­
cients attest to the position taken In this study that the standard devia­
tion of portfolio operating return and financial leverage are Inversely 
related. However, these negative signs do not reveal more than merely 
describing a simultaneous but opposite movement In direction between the 
blvarlate sample.
As a preliminary step towards examining the degree of relationship 
between the variability of operating return and financial leverage, the 
standard error of estimate was computed. The smaller the value of this 
statistic, the greater the degree of relationship between two variables.
In the limiting case, when two variables are perfectly correlated, the 
standard error of estimate assumes a value of zero. In addition to the 
degree of Interdependence between two variables, the magnitude of the 
standard error of estimate is Influenced by the unit of measurement used.
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For example, although debt-to-equity is more correlated with the standard 
deviation of portfolio operating returns than the ratio of total debt-to- 
total assets, the standard error of estimate related to the former measure 
of leverage is larger than that of the latter.
To eliminate the influence of differences in leverage standards, 
further evaluation of the regression analysis was required by computing 
the coefficient of correlation. This statistic has the merit of independ­
ence of measurement units. Correlation coefficients identified with two 
leverage ratios (long-term debt-to-total assets and interest-to-eamings 
before interest and taxes) showed a high degree of relationship between 
the standard deviation of portfolio operating returns and financial lever­
age. Total debt-to-total equity was found to be moderately correlated 
with portfolio standard deviation. Although the sign of the regression 
coefficient corresponding to the ratio of total debt-to-total assets was 
negative, the related correlation coefficient was barely different from 
zero.
As a final step, the levels of significance of the four correla­
tion coefficients were measured by performing the t test. Whereas the 
coefficient of correlation and the t value are directly related, the lat­
ter is used for stating the level of significance of the former. The 
task of performing the t test was preceded by computation of standard 
errors of regression coefficients because the t value is a ratio of the
regression coefficient divided by the standard error of regression coeffi- 
25
dent. The degree of association between the independent variable and
25This is one of the several approaches for determining the t value. 
For a different approach refer to Ya-lun Chou, Probability and Statistics 
for Decision Making (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), 471.
147
the ratio of total debt and total assets was found to be not significantly 
different from zero. Die correlation coefficient in which the dependent 
variable was measured by total debt-to-total equity was moderately signi­
ficant at the 0.15 level. In the remaining two cases, thé extent of re­
lationship between the variability of operating return and financial lever­
age was significant. Correlation coefficients identified with long-term 
debt-to-total assets and interest-to-eamings before interest and taxes 
were significant at the 0.005 level and the 0.01 level, respectively.
CHAPTER V
bUnnAKI AMU LUHLLUblUH
The objective of this dissertation is to examine, theoretically 
and empirically, the leverage implication of the portfolio effect for di­
versified firms. As a main thesis, corporate diversification is predicted 
to induce increased debt capacity of conglomerate firms. To pursue this 
line of inquiry, in addition to the introductory and concluding chapters, 
the study is divided into three main parts: theoretical framework, review
of selected empirical studies on conglomerate mergers and capital struc­
ture, and empirical analysis regarding the leverage effects of corporate 
diversification.
Chapter II is concerned with a theoretical and comprehensive dis­
cussion of multiple issues related to the stated hypothesis. The financial 
advantage of conglomerate mergers, in terms of augmented leverage capacity, 
is predicated on the theoretical and empirical merit of the net income 
hypothesis. Similarly, a general inverse relationship between operating 
risk and financial leverage, advanced by the traditional view of corporate 
finance, is the basis for predicting the effect of diversification on the 
capital structure of multi-industry firms. Having underscored these pre­
mises, an explanation of the dynamics of corporate diversification and 
capital structure followed. Sustained acquisitions from diverse industries 
enables a conglomerate firm to achieve progressive measures of stability
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In operating return. The resulting portfolio effect or, what is the same,
decline in the variability of operating returns, in turn induces the use
of more leverage in the financing mix.
Other empirical studies concerning conglomerate performance have,
either relied on a naive view of diversification, or have diligently avoided
the complexity of conglomerate portfolio analysis at the operating level.
The latter group consists of those studies that classify samples of common
stocks by type (conglomerate firms, mutual funds, undiversified companies)
and compare the risk-retum performance of conglomerate securities with
those of other groups and the market index.^ To the former group belong
those studies that measure corporate diversification by a linear summation
2
of industries in which a conglomerate firm held subsidiaries. Such a sim­
plistic approach to diversification is criticized on the following grounds. 
First, the operating risk characteristics of individual subsidiaries are 
not defined. Second, identical participation levels are implied for each 
subsidiary composing the parent conq>any. Third, the movement of each sub­
sidiary's operating return is not specified in relation to those of other 
subsidiaries. Fourth, variance of subsidiary operating returns, covari­
ances among subsidiary operating returns, and the relative weight of each 
subsidiary are not explicitly treated as a whole in measuring the operat­
ing risk of the parent company.
Smith and Schreiner, "A Portfolio Analysis of Conglomerate Diver­
sification," 423-27, Westerfield, "A Note on the Measurement of Conglomer­
ate Diversification," 912-14, and Melicher and Rush, "The Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms: Recent Risk and Return Experience," 384-87.
2
Weston and Mansinghka, "Tests of the Efficiency Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms," 921-22, and Melicher and Rush, "The Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms: Recent Risk and Return Experience," 382-84.
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Two empirical studies, cited in Chapter III, have shown that 
conglomerate firms attained the highest mean growth rate of leverage
3
ratios in relation to control sasq>les of undiversified firms. In both 
studies, the effect of diversification on capital structure was reflected 
by a simple trend analysis of leverage ratios. Consequently, the treat­
ment of diversification was both naive and implicit. The distinguishing 
feature of the present study is the application of the portfolio model 
for measuring the operating risk of a conglomerate firm. Although the 
scope of the empirical investigation is limited to a sample of one con­
glomerate firm, the analysis consisted of three principal and successive 
steps: analysis of subsidiaries, conglomerate portfolio analysis, and
regression analysis. As a preliminary step, parameters of individual sub­
sidiaries are computed in terms of variance of operating returns, covari­
ances among operating returns, and participation levels for eight subsi­
diaries of the LTV Corporation. A model of portfolio standard deviation 
is employed to determine the variability of the parent company's operating 
return, at the end of each year during the period 1962-1971. Finally, 
the proposition pertaining to the leverage implication of the portfolio 
effect is tested by separately regressing four different standards of 
leverage on the parameter of portfolio operating risk. The regression 
coefficients are tested further for direction of change of the blvarlate 
sample and their degree of correlation. In terms of the former, the hypo­
thesized inverse relationship between the variability of operating return
O
Weston and Mansinghka, "Tests of the Efficiency Performance of 
Conglomerate Firms," 927, and Melicher and Rush, "The Performance of Con­
glomerate Firms: Recent Risk and Return Experience," 382-84.
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and financial leverage is supported. With reference to the latter, the 
tests show mixed results. While one correlation test shows that the de­
gree of association between operating risk and financial structure is 
not markedly different from zero, the remaining three correlation analyses 
produced degrees of interdependence between the two variables ranging 
from moderate to strong. In the aggregate, therefore, hypothesis of 
this paper is supported: diversification increases the leverage capa­
city of conglomerate firms. However, one swallow does not make a summer; 
nor does evidence derived from a case study warrant generalizations about 
the effect of corporate diversification on capital structure.
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APPENDIX A
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES BY SUBSIDIARY: 1962 - 1971
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
luTA 11868. 8840. 9622. 8311. 12453. 20695. 33885. 43240. 36811. 15693.
ILTE 2403. 2104. 2021. 4736. 7119. 12033. 10332. -2109. 9767. 6882.
LTP 8737. 1136. 10777. -714. 455. 12652. 2480. 15151. 18773. 19774.
LTL 816. 1728. 1179. 1577. 2427. 5588. 9308. 4466. 2037. 3151.
LTO 573. -24. 1780. 4858. 14665. 17666. 16424. 433. 9916. 0.
LTW 16735. 16402. 26369. 17994. 27405. 27799. 37842. 38052. 48135. 44479.
LTB 5628. 4098. 12032. 15098. 27240. 17352. 26855. 21145. 16600. 24211.
LTJ 46326. 87752. 103660. 89749. 117019. 39646. 46059. 37121. 4525. 39620.
ONo
APPENDIX B 
TOTAL ASSETS BY SUBSIDIARY: 1962 - 1971
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
LTA 79513. 53917. 45473. 67490. 104085. 198628. 314323. 475478. 431380. 364377
LTE 12156. 8775. 9470. 49113. 67284. 99865. 115292. 107754. 92941. 86363
LTP 55657. 62191. 118393. 90907. 138322. 312404. 1288214. 1233555. 1001632. 678389
LTL 7757. 7059. 11600. 21153. 24193. 69884. 112815. 101247. 43437. 39664
].T0 17340. 22890. 30215. 39884. 52647. 135716. 164077. 180981. 174864. 181577
LTW 148331. 149093. 160998. 173393. 196210. 219051. 286531. 337576. 327147. 344103
LTB 95896. 94596. 98805. 130336. 321678. 378016. 372458. 376155. 367021. 347013
LTJ 825794. 868402. 917767. 933869. 1110266. 1092800. 1154207. 1122629. 1188068. 1187492
APPENDIX C
TOTAL EQUITY BY SUBSIDIARY: 1962 - 1971
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
LTA 66089. 31513. 6047. 9653. 25746. 34847. 64638. 111928. 121560. 118913.
LTE 7955. 5873. 1984. 4163. 12064. 25948. 30540. 25907. 30952. 32177.
LTP 21381. 27616. 25468. 30534. 58906. 245409. 288567. 268174. 181490. 207851.
I.TL 6659. 6083. 3301. 3850. 4695. 18360. 22703. 23343. 14379. 15046.
I,TO 15876. 17781. 19915. 22305. 24982. 34214. 40617. 44947. 47316. 47018.
I.TW 98426. 99953. 108780. 112968. 121983. 103866. 118596. 134984. 85796. 78820.
LTB 39330. 40046. 45722. 54877. 83218. 74446. 83736. 87578. 81680. 90820.
I.TJ 553129. 576876. 616256. 648839. 691062. 703884. 710333. 696684. 669761. 677764.
to
APPENDIX D
FRACTION OF LTV CONTROLLING INTEREST BY SUBSIDIARY: 1962 - 1971
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
LTA 100. 100. 100. 90. 75. 82. 70. 63. 63. 62.
LTE 100. 100. 100. 90. 76. 71. 70. 69. 69. 69.
LTP 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100. 100.
LTL 100. 100. 100. 90. 88. 72. 74. 73. 73. 58.
LTO 0. 0. 0. 0. 82. 87. 86. 86. 100. 0.
LTW 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 79. 79. 83. 89. 84.
LTB 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 66. 56. 57. 0.
LTJ 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 63. 81. 81. 81.
o>
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APPENDIX E
SELECTED FINANCIAL VARIABLES OF THE LTV CORPORATION: 1962 - 1971
1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
DEBT-EQUITY
RATIO 3.0 1.3 9.6 5.0 3.7 1.5 10.0 7.0 11.4 6.9
TOTAL ASSETS 164.2 140.9 127.0 202.4 298.4 845.1 2648.2 2944.3 2582.1 1961.5
CURRENT LIABI­
LITIES 70.5 68.7 57.6 125.0 126.3 343.5 825.5 834.5 689.1 512.3
LONG-TERM DEBT 64.2 34.6 37.0 40.3 95.8 202.6 1236.7 1500.8 1394.7 991.5
INTEREST 5.8 3.1 4.6 3.8 5.5 17.7 67.4 122.6 128.4 96.3
EBIT 14.8 15.1 12.3 15.4 36.0 93.8 114.6 121.3 90.0 97.3
ON
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